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FROM RUM TO TOKYO: THE SEARCH FOR ANTICOLONIAL ALLIES 
BY THE RULERS OF RIAU, 1899-1914*
Barbara Watson Andaya
Japan’s admittance of foreign trade after 1854 and the dramatic 
reforms of the Meiji Restoration brought a relatively unknown country 
to the attention of the international community. In the ensuing 
decades, European statesmen, initially skeptical of Japanese efforts 
towards modernization, came to recognize that any formulation of diplo­
matic policy in the Far East must take Japan into account. A somewhat 
similar reappraisal of the balance of world power can be found in Asia, 
where the rise of Japan created for anticolonial leaders the possibil­
ity of aid from a fellow Asian nation in the struggle against foreign 
domination. Yet in comparison with countries such as China, India, 
Korea, Vietnam, and the Philippines,* 1 it seems that the Indonesian 
archipelago regarded the achievement of Japan almost with indifference.2 
However, a closer examination of specific areas in the Netherlands In­
dies would undoubtedly show that here, too, Japan’s emergence into 
prominence was noted and its significance assessed.
It should not be assumed, however, that this reaction was simply 
a paler version of what occurred in neighboring Asian countries, and
*This article is a revised version of a paper originally presented to the First 
Australian Asian Studies Conference, held at Melbourne University in May, 1976. Bene­
dict R. O’G. Anderson, Heather Sutherland, Christopher Gray, David Sissons, David 
Marr, Leonard Andaya, and Craig Reynolds read earlier drafts, and I am most grateful 
for their helpful comments and constructive criticism. I would also like to express 
my gratitude for an informative correspondence with Professor Akira Nagazumi.
1Ian H. Nish, The Anglo-Japanese Alliance: The Diplomacy of Two Island Empires 
(London: Athlone Press, 1966), p. 23; Marius B. Jansen, The Japanese and Sun Yat Sen 
(Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1954); Josefa M. Saniel, Japan and the 
Philippinesj 1868-1898 (Quezon City: University of the Philippines Press, 1963);
David Marr, Vietnamese Anti-Colonialism, 1885-1925 (Los Angeles: University of Cali­
fornia Press, 1971), pp. 61, 99-112; Percival Spear, A History of India (Baltimore: 
Penguin, 1965), 2, p. 181; C. I. Eugene Kim and Han-kyo Kim, Korea and the Politics 
of Imperialism, 1876-1910 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1967), pp. 41-42.
2J. D. Thijs, De Invloed van de Opkomst van Japan en van de Japanse Overwinning 
op Rusland in Azie3 Public Lecture, Vrije Universiteit, Amsterdam, March 26, 1965 
(Kampen: Kok, 1965), pp. 6-15. Bernhard Dahm, Sukarno and the Struggle for Indone­
sian Independence (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1969), p. 112, dates the Java­
nese response to Japan from about 1920, but Akira Nagazumi has seen it developing 
much earlier. See Nagazumi’s article, MAn Indonesian’s View of Japan: Wahidin and 
the Russo-Japanese War,” in F. H. King (ed.), The Development of Japanese Studies in 




research into local politics  in the years immediately after the Russo- 
Japanese war may well reveal identifiable  differences in the origin 
and nature of the response in various regions of the Netherlands Indies . 
In the Malay kingdoms under Dutch control, for instance, expectations 
of Japan were most clearly voiced not by a rising  generation of nation­
alists  but among the established Moslem e lit e s , men who had seen their 
prestige steadily  eroded by a government which was not only alien  but 
kafir  ( i n f i d e l ) .  Priding themselves on their Islamic heritage, regard­
ing themselves as an integral segment of a wider Moslem brotherhood, 
they and their forebears had traditionally  looked to the Middle East 
for leadership and guidance .3 Their w illingness now to regard Japan 
as a mentor and protector points to an expansion of the traditional 
Weltanschauung which through the centuries had helped to define Malay 
society, and in which Japan had had no place. As elsewhere in A sia , 
the changed view of Japan reflected a new sense of being orang timur 
(Easterners/Orientals) as opposed to the orang barat (Westerners/Occi- 
d e n ta ls ); but in the Malay case the acceptance of an "Asianism " shared 
with Japan was fac ilita te d  because it had already been acknowledged by 
the Islamic community at large. Without such sanction, the appeal of 
Japan would have been in fin ite ly  weaker.
Po litical Background to Nineteenth Century Riau
The evolution of this identification  with Japan can be illustrated  
by events in the Kingdom of Riau, named for its principal island , s it u ­
ated about forty miles from Singapore. Two centuries e arlier , Riau, 
then known as Johor, had been the most powerful Malay state in the 
arch ip elago ,4 but by the end of the nineteenth century there was little  
to attest to its former greatness. An act of regicide in 1699 brought 
about a period of turmoil which had changed the very nature of the 
p olity . Johor’ s newly founded dynasty fell  an easy victim to Minangka- 
bau invaders and was only reestablished in 1722 with the assistance of 
outsiders, a group of migrant Bugis from Sulawesi (C elebes). In re ­
turn for this help , the t itle  of Yamtuan Muda (Deputy Ruler) was 
granted to the Bugis leader and to his descendants in p erp etu ity .5 
Despite local Malay opposition to the increasing power assumed by the 
Bugis, the capital on the island of Riau flourished throughout the 
eighteenth century, remaining a principal entrepot on the traditional 
sea route from India to C h in a .6
3I am aware that I am using the term Middle East anachronistically, since it 
was only coined in 1902 by an American naval historian. Malays themselves had no 
specific word for the Islamic heartland, that is, the lands of predominantly Persian, 
Arabic, and Turkish speech. Perhaps the nearest equivalent would be the phrase adopt­
ed from Persian navigators, Mnegeri diatas anginM (the lands to the windward of the 
southwest monsoon), i .e .,  Arabia, Persia, and India. For a discussion of the adoption 
of the term "Middle East," see Bernard Lewis, The Middle East and the West (London: 
Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1964), pp. 16-17.
4See Leonard Y. Andaya, The Kingdom of Johor, 1641-1728: Economic and Political 
Developments (Kuala Lumpur: Oxford University Press, 1975), Chs. 1-4. In the nine­
teenth century the name Johor was used to refer to the peninsular state under the 
rule of the old Temenggong family.
5This is obviously a very inadequate summary of a complex series of events. For 
a detailed analysis of the period, see Andaya, The Kingdom of Johor, Chs. 6-10.
6Dianne Lewis, "The Growth of the Country Trade to the Straits of Malacca,
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Both Malays and Europeans of that era would have found it d i f f i ­
cult to imagine that this thriving port would become a quiet backwater, 
but an unsuccessful Johor attack on Dutch-controlled Melaka in 1784 
marked the prelude to a continuous decline as the kingdom fell  increas­
ingly under Dutch power. The so-called London Treaty of 1824, dividing 
Johor’ s territories between Britain  and the Netherlands, was followed 
by another contract in 1830 which formalized Dutch protection over what 
was now termed the Sultanate of Riau-Lingga.7 * The once-mighty kingdom 
now comprised only a small area on the east coast of Sumatra, the 
sparsely inhabited islands which spread from Singapore to the South 
China Sea, and the Riau-Lingga archipelago it s e lf . R iau ’ s decline was 
further emphasized by the prosperity and proximity of Singapore, which 
rapidly eclipsed Riau as the most important trading center in the r e ­
gion. The contrast between the two ports, which had already struck an 
English observer in 1847,®  was even more marked by the turn of the cen­
tury. Henri Borel, a Dutch o ffic ia l  who v isited  Riau in 1902, felt  as 
if  he were in e x ile , amid a quietness so oppressive that it was death­
lik e . In Singapore, by comparison, the streets were f i l le d  with a 
variety and excitement which, for Borel, epitomized the "Great L i f e . " 9
Increasing Dutch intervention in court politics  also accentuated 
the extent to which Riau had lost control over its own destiny. For 
example, in 1857, the Malay ruler was abruptly deposed and replaced by 
his uncle, a prince not of fully  royal b i r t h .10 But more far reaching 
in its ram ifications was Batavia ’ s failure  to appoint a new Yamtuan 
Muda in 1899, following the death of the old man who had held the p o s i­
tion for forty years. Up to this time the Dutch had supported the 
existence of the post because they considered it a useful counterweight 
to the Malay Sultan. But in the meantime, extensive intermarriage be­
tween the royal fam ilies meant that the number of princes of "pure" 
blood, whether Bugis or Malay, had dwindled rapidly . In 1884, a raja  
of mixed descent, Abdul Rahman, had ascended the Riau throne; and to 
the Dutch, the old div ision  between a "Malay" Sultan and a "Bugis" 
Yamtuan Muda seemed an a r t if ic ia l , cumbersome anomaly. Since the des­
ignated h e ir , Raja A li Kelana, had already expressed a reluctance to 
succeed, 1899 was considered a convenient time to broach the idea of 
abolishing the post a lto g e th e r .11
1760-1777," Journal of the Malaysian Branch of the Royal Asiatic Society (henceforth 
JMBRAS), 43, 2 (1970), pp. 114-30.
7For further details, see E. Netscher, "De Nederlanders in Djohor en Siak,"
Verhandelingen van het Bataviaasch Genootschap van Kunsten en Wetenschappen, 35 
(1870), pp. 166-294.
®J. T. Thomson, "A Glance at Rhio," Journal of the Indian Archipelago and 
Eastern Asia, 1 (1847), pp. 68-74.
9Henri Borel, Wijsheid en Schoonheid uit Indie (Amsterdam: Van Kampen, 1905), 
pp. 4-41. See also C. W. J. Wenneker, "Van Batavia naar Riau via Singapore," Berich- 
ten uit Rederlandsch Oost Indie voor de Leden van den Sint Claverbond, 1 (1902), p. 4.
10Netscher, "De Nederlanders," pp. 298-308; Virginia Matheson, "Mahmud, Sultan 
of Riau and Lingga (1823-1864)," Indonesia, 13 (April 1972), pp. 119-46; Raja Ali 
Haji, Tuhfat al-Nafis (Singapore: Malaysia Publications, 1965), p. 22.
11Verbaal (henceforth V), February 20, 1901, W38, Govt. Sec. to Resident Hoog- 
kamer of Riau, October 18, 1899; Hoogkamer to.Gov. Gen., June 18, 1899. (All archival 
references are from the Department of Internal Affairs, The Hague). Raja Ali never
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Despite the complicated genealogical links between Bugis and Malay 
royalty, and the disappearance of the Bugis language as well as most 
Bugis customs, those princes who could claim Bugis blood continued to 
feel a close a ffin ity  and were keenly aware of their cultural in h e ri­
tance. The ties of kinship binding them together were accentuated by 
the fact that the majority of them lived near the Yamtuan Muda’ s r e s i ­
dence on the island of Penyengat,12 just offshore from the Dutch admin­
istrative  center of Tanjung Pinang. It was on Penyengat in 1866 that 
the famous scholar and theologian, Raja A li Haji (ca. 1809-ca. 1870) 
had completed his Tuhfat al- Nafis, the epic tale of the fortunes of his 
Bugis ancestors in the Malay world. A principal concern of this work 
was a ju stific a tio n  of the Bugis presence in Riau, namely that in 1722 
they had come to the aid of the Malay ruler when all others had failed  
him. The office  of Yamtuan Muda, bestowed upon the Bugis leader, was a 
symbol of the great services they had rendered and tangible proof that 
they had earned their high place in Riau s o c ie t y .13 Understandably, 
then, the Penyengat princes greeted the Dutch announcement in September 
1900, that henceforth no Yamtuan Muda would be appointed, with resentment 
and anger. 1 *
H ostility  to the Dutch was intensified  by the pervasive Islamic 
atmosphere in Riau and by the nBugisM p rin c es ’ domination of R iau ’ s 
religious leadership. Since the eighteenth century they had been r e ­
nowned for their patronage of v isiting  ulama, and successive Yamtuan 
Muda had personally promoted the reformist ideas which swept through 
the Moslem world in the wake of the Wahabi movement.15 In the 1890s
spelled out his reasons for refusing the post, but the Dutch assumed he wished to 
devote more time to his business activities.
12Penyengat had been given by a former Sultan to his Bugis wife, the sister of 
the Yamtuan Muda, in about 1805. Most of the Bugis princes moved there, while the 
Malay court was maintained on Lingga. In 1899, Sultan Abdul Rahman also moved to 
Penyengat. Raja Ali Haji, Tuhfat, pp. 255, 267; Koloniaal Verslag: Biglagen Verslag 
der Handelingen van de Tweede Kamer dev Staten Generaal, 1900-1901 (The Hague: 
Nijhoff, 1900), p. 31.
13Andaya, The Kingdom of Johor, p. 8; Virginia Matheson, "The Tuhfat al-Nafis: 
Structure and Sources," Bijdragen tot de taal-, land- en voVkenkunde (henceforth 
BKI), 127, 3 (1971), pp. 388-90.
1**V February 4, 1905, A4, Resident de Kanter of Riau to Gov. Gen., November 9, 
1903. The strongly voiced objections of an earlier Resident, A. L. van Hasselt, who 
left Riau in 1896, were overruled. See E. B. Kielstra, "Nederland’s Betrekkingen 
tot Riau,” Onze Eeuw, 12 (1912), p. 206.
15For example, Yamtuan Muda Raja Haji Abdullah (1857-58) was for many years the 
murshid, or director, of the Nakshahbandiyyah tarekat (mystical order) which had 
strong connections with Turkey and was particularly influential in fostering more 
exclusive Islamic attitudes. According to the Tuhfat al-Nafis, all the Penyengat 
princes belonged to the Nakshahbandiyyah. Raja Ali Haji, Tuhfat, pp. 350, 369. See 
also Anthony Reid, "Nineteenth Century Pan-Islam in Indonesia and Malaysia," Journal 
of Asian Studies, 26, 2 (1967), p. 273; J. Spencer Trimingham, The Sufi Orders in 
Islam (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1971), pp. 74, 130; Christine Dobbin, "Islamic Re­
vivalism in Minangkabau at the Turn of the Nineteenth Century," Modem Asian Studies, 
8, 3 (1974), pp. 325-26. It is interesting to note the similarities with the situa­
tion in Banten, also a strongly Islamic area. In Banten, however, the religious 
elite lacked political status, and the secular elite had lost touch with the Muslim
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an Islamic study club, the Persekutuan Rushdiyyah, was established on 
Penyengat as a forum for debate on Islamic issues and a medium for d is ­
seminating religious t r e a t is e s .16 Most of the princes of Bugis descent 
were members, and, not surprisingly , the Rushdiyyah Club became a focus 
for anti-Dutch feelin g .
One of the prominent club leaders was Raja A li H a j i fs son, Raja 
Khalid Hasan, generally known as Raja Hitam. Like his father, Raja 
Hitam saw the increasing intrusions of the West as dangerous to the 
health of the Moslem community, and he was m ilitantly  opposed to the 
Dutch presence in Riau. In his capacity as royal scribe he wielded 
considerable authority in court c irc les , and at times the Sultan turned 
to him for a d v ic e .17 Even more important was the leadership given by 
Raja A li Kelana, Raja Hitam1s third cousin and half-brother to the 
Sultan. Raja A l i 's  refusal to accept the Yamtuan Muda position had 
precipitated the furor of 1899, but despite his lack of any formal 
office  he remained, in the words of the Resident, "a  man of great in ­
fluence in government a f f a i r s .” 18 As the great-grandson of the legend­
ary Bugis hero, Raja H a ji , he could claim an especially  prestigious 
an c estry ;19 he was also highly respected by Malays, not only in Riau 
and Singapore, but all along the Sumatran coast, for his religious 
learning, his interest in promoting education--and his business acumen. 
Raja A li owned fifteen  houses in Singapore, as well as his own r e s i ­
dence, had coconut plantations on several islands , controlled a number 
of mining concessions, and operated two steamships which plied  between 
Singapore and Riau carrying passengers and goods .20
community. See Sartono Kartodirdjo, The Peasants' Revolt of Banten in 1888: Its Con­
ditions > Course and Sequel. A Case Study of Social Movements in Indonesia (The Hague: 
De Nederlandsche Boek- en Steendrukkerij v/h Smits, 1966), pp. 61, 94.
16For a discussion of the strongly Islamic atmosphere which prevailed in Riau 
during this period, see Barbara Watson Andaya and Virginia Matheson, "Islamic Thought 
and Malay Tradition: The Writings of Raja Ali Haji of Riau (ca. 1809-ca. 1870)," pre­
sented to a colloquium on Southeast Asian Perceptions of the Past held at the Austra­
lian National University, Canberra, in February 1976. An example of a publication by 
the Rushdiyyah Club is Risala al-fawa’id al-wafiyat ft shark mafna al-tahiyyat, a 
translation done by the Club members of an Arabic work by the Mecca teacher Said 
al-Syarif Abdullah, which deals with commentaries on the meaning of the tahiyyat 
prayer (Penyengat: Rushdiyyah Club, 1894). The arrangements for the celebrations at 
the end of the fasting month in 1896 were also published by the Rushdiyyah Club under 
the title Taman Penghiburan, iaitu berita kesukaan pada hari idul fitri yang diadakan 
oleh lid-lid Rushdiyyah Kelub (Riau: Rushdiyyah Club, 1896).
17V February 10, 1911, Y3, Note by Resident de Bruyn Kops of Riau, Bijlage M, 
Secret, February 2, 1903; V February 4, 1905, A11, Resident de Kanter of Riau to Gov. 
Gen., February 29, 1904, fo. 6.
18V February 20, 1901, W38, Resident Hoogkamer to Gov. Gen., June 18, 1899; V 
February 4, 1905, A1*, Resident de Lanoy of Riau to Gov. Gen., December 22, 1902.
19Raja Haji, regarded as a living saint (keramat hidup) even in his own life­
time, was Yamtuan Muda from 1777 to 1784, and was killed during a Bugis attack on 
Dutch Melaka. See Netscher, "De Nederlanders," pp. 167-69, for a brief description of 
Raja Haji's life.
20V February 20, 1901, W38, Political Report on Riau, fo. 3; V February 4,
1905, Kab. Litt. A42, Govt. Sec. to Political.Agent and Consul-General at Cairo and 
to Consul of Netherlands at Jeddah, November 19, 1904; V February 10, 1911, Y3, Note
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Raja A l i ’ s Singapore interests were exceptional only in their 
variety and extent, for although the Riau princes frowned morally on 
the activ ities  of the Westernized Malays of Singapore and peninsular 
Johor, they s t ill  felt  the powerful pull of that more cosmopolitan 
s o c ie t y .21 A number of them maintained modest residences in Singapore 
which they v isited  frequently, and many traded extensively with Singa­
pore merchants. At the level of the common man, too, there was daily 
interaction , since R iau ’ s fish  and copra were dependent on Singapore 
markets, and most of the goods found in R ia u fs shops were transported 
directly  from Singapore by boat.
The constant coming and going, the ever-deepening connection b e ­
tween these two worlds, was crucial in shaping Riau politics  during 
the period under discussion , for it enabled the Islamic leaders on 
Riau to keep in close touch with new developments in Moslem thought. 
After the opening of the Suez Canal in 1869, Singapore was only two 
weeks from Port Said by steamship, and thus it became a major embarka­
tion point for the pilgrim age, a vital link in an international network 
of Islamic communication. Here Moslems from all over the Indonesian 
archipelago met to begin the haj to the holy c ity , and here they r e ­
turned to share thoughts on their experiences in the Middle E a s t .22 
A striking feature of the time was the swiftness with which ideas pro­
pounded in C airo ’ s al-Azhar University , or discussed in a Mecca market, 
reached the archipelago’ s Moslem community. It was on this exchange 
of information--sometimes remarkably accurate, sometimes simply wild 
rumor--that R iau ’ s understanding of world p olitics  was based.
Riau in the Islamic World
In the reviving Islamic climate of the nineteenth century, the 
classical div ision  of the world into Dar al-Islam, the House of Submis­
sion, and Dar al-Harb, the House of War (in fid e l  lan d s), between which 
perpetual conflict was ordained, seemed very relevant. The crumbling of 
the Ottoman Empire in Europe and North Africa and its hum iliating de­
feat in the Russo-Turkish War of 1877-78 highlighted an apparently 
general Moslem retreat before the advance of the Christian nations.
The search for the causes of Islam ’ s weakness in relation to the West 
became the great preoccupation of reflective  Moslems. For many, nota­
bly the Turkish Sultan Abdul Hamid (1876- 1909), the answer lay in a 
rev italizatio n  of the idea of Pan-Islam, a worldwide Islamic community 
which would unite under his leadership and drive back the in fid e ls . 
Throughout his reign , this concept was actively propagated in the Mid­
dle Eastern press, by palace spokesmen, and among influential propa­
gandists such as Jamal al-Din al-Afghani. 23
by Resident de Bruyn Kops of Riau, December 28, 1910; V January 30, 1912, 41, Advisor 
for Native Affairs to Director of Justice, May 3, 1911. Raja Ali was involved in 
the establishment of a modern religious school in Singapore, and wrote several arti­
cles on education in the Malay journal al-Iman. See below, n. 85.
21V February 4, 1905, A4, Resident de Kanter to Gov. Gen., July 27, 1904;
Snouck Hurgronje to Gov. Gen., May 7, 1904.
22W. R. Roff, The Origins of Malay Nationalism (Kuala Lumpur: University of 
Malaya Press, 1967), Ch. 2.
23See, for example, Lewis, The Middle East and the Westy pp. 101-14; Mohamed
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The Malay areas of the Netherlands Indies were particularly  recep­
tive to such suggestions, for the Ottoman Sultanate had long been r e ­
garded with special veneration. In stories and legends the "Raja Rum" 
was depicted as a mighty king who inhabited a magical land, possessing 
untold wealth and exerting unlimited power. 2t* For centuries succes­
sive rulers of Rum had been engaged in unremitting warfare against the 
infidels  and, despite temporary advances by the unbelievers, the Otto­
man Sultan "is  yet, and remains, the king of all the kings on e a r t h ." * 25 
Recognition of Abdul Hamid as Islam 1s champion came naturally to those 
who, like Raja Hitam fs father, Raja A li H a ji , had seen the Crimean War 
as a jihads a holy war waged against kafir  fo r c e s .26 Beginning in the 
middle of the century the religious character of anti-Dutch d isturb­
ances in south and east Sumatra had become more pronounced; in 1855 
the Sultan of Jambi had actually succeeded in lodging an appeal with 
the Ottoman Sultan, asking for documents declaring him to be a Turkish 
vassal, which would enable him to resist Dutch demands. Local Moslem 
feeling had also been aroused by European attacks on the Turkish em­
p ire . In 1867, for instance, Malay-language pamphlets were distributed 
in Singapore advocating Islamic unity in opposition to European aggres­
sion in the B alk an s .27 Sultan Abdul Hamid’ s fervor, especially  his 
singling out of the Netherlands as Islam ’ s bete noire3 infused new 
sp irit  into a traditional conception of the world; during the prolonged 
Dutch-Aceh war (1873- 1903), Turkey’ s imminent intervention was widely 
anticipated within the Moslem community.28
Aboulkhir Zaki, ffModern Muslim Thought in Egypt and Its Impact on Islam in Malaya" 
(Ph.D. thesis, University of London, 1965), pp. 1-33; Deliar Noer, The Modernist Mos­
lem Movement in Indonesia (Kuala Lumpur: Oxford University Press, 1973), p. 28.
2**This attitude reflected Turkish dominance of the Middle East from the elev­
enth to the sixteenth century. See Anthony Reid, "Sixteenth Century Turkish Influ­
ence in Western Indonesia," Journal of Southeast Asian History3 10, 3 (1969), pp. 
395-414; Kassim Ahmad (ed.), Hikayat Hang Tuah (Kuala Lumpur: Dewan Bahasa, 1971), 
pp. 437-77; Abdullah Hj. Musa Lubis (ed.), Kesah Raja Marong Mahawangsa (Kuala Lum­
pur: Pustaka Antara, 1965), pp. 17-69; Teuku Iskandar (ed.), "De Hikajat Atjeh," 
Verhandelingen van het Koninklijk Instituut voor Taal-s Land- en Volkenkunde, 26 
(1958), p. 167.
25C. Snouck Hurgronje, "Jong Turkije, Herinneringen uit Stamboel, 25 July-23 
September 1908," Versjpreide Gesohriften (Bonn: Kurt Schroeder, 1924), 3, p. 230.
26Handschrift 420, Koninklijk Instituut voor Taal-, Land- en Volkenkunde, Leiden; 
"Memorie van Overgave" by E. Netscher, 1870. fo. 12. See also E. S. de Klerk, History 
of the Netherlands East Indies (Amsterdam: Israel, 1938, 1975), 2, p. 334; and Karto- 
dirdjo, The Peasants' Revolt of Banten, p. 142. The term Turkey, though used among 
Europeans from the thirteenth century, was not adopted by Turks themselves until 
1923. For the greater part of the nineteenth century there was no real sense of 
nationhood, and even the term Ottoman was associated with a dynasty rather than a 
nation. Turks thought of themselves principally as Moslems, and as subjects of the 
Ottoman Sultan. "Turkey" is used here for the sake of convenience. See Bernard 
Lewis, The Emergence of Modern Turkey (London: Oxford University Press, 1968), pp. 1-3.
27Reid, "Nineteenth Century Pan-Islam," pp. 273-74, 281.
28Ibid., pp. 274-83. The Turkish appeal appears to have been much more muted 
in the peninsular Malay states, although in 1892 it was alleged that a certain Arab 
had toured the southern states asking the chiefs to sign a document requesting Turkish 
assistance in ousting the British. It was to. this Arab's actions that the Pahang 
disturbances of that year were attributed. Roff, The Origins of Malay Nationalisms 
p. 71, n. 52.
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The sympathy of the Riau court for the Acehnese cause was well known, 
and many Penyengat princes would surely have supported the declaration 
of jihad against the Dutch proposed to them by certain Singapore Mos­
lem s.29 To engage in such an undertaking was obviously im possible. for 
Riau, now under tight Dutch control, but the court continued to be 
heartened by the idea, fostered by the Turkish Consul-General in 
Batavia, Muhammad Kiamil Bey (1897- 99), of a united Islamic brother­
hood.
K iam ilfs transfer to Singapore in 190430 coincided with increas­
ing resentment on Penyengat as it became apparent that the Dutch were 
adamant in their refusal to appoint another Yamtuan Muda. Raja A li 
Kelana had been especially  shaken by this decision . Although he him­
self had declined the position , he had always assumed that some other 
prince of suitable descent would be chosen in his stead. The Bugis 
p r in ces1 anger had been exacerbated by several new regulations which 
they considered further slights to R iau ’ s p r e s t ig e .31 Since the colo­
nial government seemed deaf to all protests, the Riau princes, recog­
nizing  their own impotence, had decided that only one path lay open-- 
the despatch of an envoy to the Raja Rum. In early February 1904, 
therefore, at a secret gathering in Raja A l i 's  house, it had been 
agreed that a letter should be sent to the Turkish Sultan. This le t ­
ter would declare that, since Riau was a Moslem kingdom, it requested 
Turkish help to ensure that the position of Raja Muda be resto red .32
K iam ilfs arrival in Singapore provided the Riau court with addi­
tional impetus. During the following months a meeting was arranged 
with Kiamil in S ingapore ,33 * and over $20 ,000  (Singapore) was raised to 
finance the mission to Turkey. In October, Raja A li left  for the 
Middle East, carrying with him a number of letters from the royal ar ­
chives as well as the Dutch treaty made with Riau at the time of the 
ruler* s deposition in 1 8 5 7 . 3i* As far as Dutch agents could ascertain ,
29Reid, "Nineteenth Century Pan-Islam," p. 276. Riau was about 83 percent 
Moslem, with the remaining 17 percent almost all Chinese. Muhd. Djinguiz, "L*Islam 
dans les possessions hollandaises, portugaises et americaines de l'archipel Indien," 
Revue du monde musulman (henceforth RMM) , 7 (January-February 1909), p. 108.
30Reid, "Nineteenth Century Pan-Islam," p. 280.
31These rulings concerned flying the Riau flag, seating arrangements for 
princes during an official visit by the Resident, and the number of cannon shots to 
be fired in greeting the Sultan when he visited Tanjung Pinang.
32V February 4, 1905, Kab. Litt. A1*2, Resident de Kanter to Gov. Gen., Febru­
ary 29, 1904, foil. 14-15, and Govt. Sec. to Netherlands consuls at Cairo and Jeddah, 
November 19, 1904. It is significant that the actual writer of the letter was a 
haji who previously had been attached to the Sultan of Jambi and was now a teacher 
in Raja Ali's house. In 1903, the Sultan of Jambi had made another appeal to Turkey, 
which apparently also reached Sultan Abdul Hamid. Reid, "Nineteenth Century Pan- 
Islam,*' p. 282.
33V June 15, 1906, 55, Appendix; V February 4, 1905, Kab. Litt. A4, Snouck 
Hurgronje to Gov. Gen., May 7, 1904.
3/*Ibid., and V April 18, 1908, 1, Resident de Kanter to Gov. Gen., January 
25, 1905; V June 15, 1906, 55, De Kanter to Gov. Gen., May 18, 1905.
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Raja A li never actually reached Constantinople ,35 but in any case Abdul 
Hamid would have been incapable of confronting the Dutch openly. In 
July 1904, he had made a general appeal to the Dutch queen on behalf 
of Moslems in the Netherlands Indies , but he was not w illing  to risk 
further a c t io n .36 Apparently unable to arouse any interest in R iau fs 
case, Raja A li returned home in March 1905, only to find  that his half- 
brother, the Riau ruler , had succumbed to unrelenting Dutch pressure. 
Less committed to the Bugis cause than Raja A l i , and possibly unwilling 
to see the reestablishment of a post which might counter his own p o s i­
tion , Sultan Abdul Rahman had at last agreed to conclude a treaty which 
for the first  time would specifically  omit any reference to the Yamtuan 
Muda and which would also give the Governor-General the right to ap­
point the heir to the Riau thro ne .37
Raja A l i , Raja Hitam, and the leading court members, all with some 
Bugis blood, refused to be identified  with the proposed treaty. Under 
normal circumstances this would have put a halt to the proceedings, 
since custom decreed that any contract must be discussed with the court 
and receive the approval of the senior m inisters. The Dutch government 
nonetheless pressed on. By May, a draft had been drawn up, and in 
September 1905 the final version was signed by the Sultan a lo n e .38
This unprecedented flouting of adat (custom) put Penyengat in an 
uproar, but meetings, p etitio ns , and speeches, however heated, were 
obviously fu t ile . Yet at the same time the Riau court was becoming 
aware of the opening of another avenue of appeal. The Riau Sultan may 
have concluded an ignoble treaty which conceded further ground to the 
colonial adm inistration, but thousands of miles away European prestige 
had been dealt a formidable blow. On May 27, the Russian fleet had 
been destroyed by the Japanese at Tsushima, and in early September the 
Treaty of Portsmouth formalized the Japanese trium ph.39
The Growth of Japanese Power and 
the Spread of Pan-Asian Awareness
Japan ’ s dramatic rise in the late nineteenth century had encour­
aged burgeoning Asian nationalist movements to believe that an Asian
35Some years later it was reported that he had tried to obtain an audience 
with the Khedive of Egypt. V February 10, 1911, Y3, Note by Resident de Bruyn Kops, 
December 28, 1910, fo. 11.
36V October 6, 1905, 54, Resident de Kanter to Gov. Gen., April 26, 1905; V 
June 15, 1906, 55, Nota van toelichting betreffende Riau en Lingga, February 23, 
1906, foil. 13, 20; C. Smit, Bescheiden Betreffende de Buitenlandse Politiek van 
Nederland, 1848-1919 (The Hague: Nijhoff, 1958), 2, pp. 271-74.
37V October 6, 1905, 54, Resident de Kanter to Gov. Gen., April 26, 1905; V 
June 15, 1906, 55, De Kanter to Gov. Gen., May 18, 1905.
38V March 21, 1907, 3, Resident de Kanter to Gov. Gen., October 10, 1905. A 
copy of the final contract is in V June 15, 1906, 55. The Sultan was very anxious 
for his youngest son to be declared heir to the Riau throne and apparently hoped 
that the Dutch would prove more amenable to this plan if he signed the contract.
39John A. White, The Diplomacy of the Russo-Japanese War (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 1964), pp. 206 ff.
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ally now existed who would stand with them against Western imperialism. 
Any support they received from the M eiji government, however, was 
guarded and indirect, and indeed one of the aims of the M eiji o lig ar ­
chy was to eliminate diplomatic language which spoke Mas if  the Japa­
nese were on the same level of morality and c iv ilisatio n  as Chinese or 
other less advanced populations of Asia . . .  to whom they bore no 
real sim ilarity , [inflicting] upon the nation an insult which was not 
deserved .” 40 Jap an ’ s new leaders were concerned above all with the 
building of a strong nation state with high international standing.
The spread of Japanese p olitical influence in the east Asian region 
was considered v it a l , not to liberate A sia , but to protect Japanfs own 
independence, strengthen her economy, and maintain the respect of the 
world community.41
This tendency became apparent in it ia lly  in relation  to Korea, 
which the M eiji leaders believed should be preserved at all costs from 
falling  under total Chinese control, thereby endangering Japan1s secur­
ity . Peking ’ s despatch of troops to Seoul in June 1894 led almost in ­
evitably to a b rief war, in which the Chinese collapsed in the face of 
overwhelming Japanese m ilitary superiority . Despite Japan ’ s victory , 
however, she suffered the ignominy of being forced by the Western 
powers to renounce any rights to the Liaotung Peninsula, an act of 
’’international brigandage” 42 which was not easily  forgotten. In subse­
quent years the Japanese flung their national energy into efforts to 
strengthen their army and navy so that such a hum iliation would never 
recur. By the beginning of the twentieth century this policy was be­
ginning to bear fr u it . Established as a ’’colonizing nation” by the 
acquisition  of Formosa in 1895 and acknowledged as at least a superior 
Asian state by the abolition of extraterrito ria lity , Japan found her 
status in world eyes greatly enhanced by the Anglo-Japanese treaty of 
1902, which provided the prestige of friendship with the w orld ’ s 
greatest pow er.43
Though the M eiji government had thus embarked on a foreign policy 
patterned on that of the West, there was some popular support within 
Japan for the notion of Pan-Asianism, a united Asia under Japanese 
aegis. Advocates of this view saw Japan ’ s role in Asia in a variety 
of ways--as a missionary bringing the benefits of c iv iliza t io n  to 
those less fortunate, as a purveyor of peace and ju stic e , or as the 
leader of a harmonious union of Asian r a c e s .44 Novels, the forums
40Australian National Archives (henceforth ANA) A2219, Vol. I A, Relations of 
Australia and Japan and Far Eastern and Pacific Questions, 1900-1918, J. Chamberlain 
to Lord Brassey, October 20, 1897, No. 86.
41Ian Nish, Japanese Foreign Policy3 1869-1942: Kasumigaseki to Miyakezaka 
(London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1977), Chs. 1 and 2; Kenneth B. Pyle, The New 
Generation in Meiji Japan (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1969), p. 81; Marlene 
Mayo, "Attitudes towards Asia and the Beginnings of Japanese Empire," in Grant K. 
Goodman (ed.), Imperial Japan and Asia (New York: East Asian Institute, Columbia 
University, 1967), p. 11.
42Yosaburo Takekoshi, Self-Portrayal of Japan (Tokyo: Ritsumeikan University 
Press, 1939), p. 53; Pyle, The New Generation3 p. 180.
43Nish, The Anglo-Japanese Alliance3 pp. 226-35.
44Mayo, "Attitudes towards Asia," pp. 12-22; Akira Iriye, ’’The Ideology of 
Japanese Imperialism: Imperial Japan and China," in Goodman (ed.), Imperial Japan 
and Asia3 p. 35; Jansen, The Japanese and Sun Yat Sen3 p. 25.
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provided by patriotic  societies , and speeches by politicians, all served 
as media for the concept of Japan as a guide and model for other Asian 
countries, encouraging them to cast aside the fetters of feudalism .45
Most supporters of the idea of Japan1s leadership in Asia saw 
their countryTs future linked principally  to east Asia-- Siberia, China, 
Formosa, and Korea. But there were some who looked further a fie ld , to 
the Nanyo, the Southern Seas. A tiny group, even among the Pan-Asian- 
ists , they were nonetheless articulate and p r o lif ic . In 1887, one of 
their spokesmen, Shiga Shigetaka (1863- 1927), published Nanyo j i j i  
(Conditions in the South Seas ) ,  in which he deplored the indifference 
of the Japanese to the onward march of Europeans in the Pacific  area. 
Japan must establish  itse lf  as an ally  of Asian and Pacific  peoples, 
for Mi f  the coloured races do not now exert themselves, then ultimately 
the world w ill  become the private possession of the white r a c e .” 46 
Another enthusiast, Suganuma Teifu  (1865- 89), pressed for more active 
participation  in the region. In a book entitled  Shin Nihon no Nanyo 
no yume (New Jap an1 s Dream of Aspirations to the South Seas'), he argued 
that Japan should protect itse lf  from Western expansion by "helping 
neighbouring countries, such as Siam, in warding off the western 
powers1 encroachments, or by aiding or achieving control of neighbour­
ing colonies, such as French Annam, Dutch Java and Sum atra ."47
This type of argument, advanced in personal discussions and un­
o ffic ia l  meetings, did much to convince certain anticolonial groups in 
Vietnam and the Philippines that Japan would assist them to end foreign 
rule. But in Riau during the final years of the nineteenth century 
there was no counterpart of Vietnam ’ s Phan Dinh Phung or the F ilipino  
Aguinaldo to seize on the hopes held out by Japanese revolutionaries 
and right-wing patriots , and for the Riau princes any idea of seeking 
common cause with the Japanese would have been completely alien . In 
contrast to the time-honored links with Rum, Japan ’ s impingement on 
Malay society in the previous two hundred years had been neg lig ib le .
It was known vaguely as a land of exotic products--silk, porcelain , 
fans, screens, and costly lacquerware--but its enforced isolation  after 
the Tokugawa proscription of foreign trade in 1636 meant that the Japa­
nese as a people had l ittle  concrete identity  in Malay e y e s .48 While 
orang Keling  (In d ia n s ), Chinese, Feringgi (Portuguese), and Siamese 
appear frequently in Malay texts, the Japanese are conspicuously ab­
sent. Even the peripatetic Malay hero, Hang Tuah, has only a chance 
meeting with orang Jepun, and in this episode they are seen as reckless 
and unruly swordsmen, infidels  who attempt to commit derhaka (treason) 
against the ruler of Siam .49
45Jansen, The Japanese and Sun Tat Sens pp. 31, 33, 35, 43; Saniel, Japan and 
the Philippines^ pp. 73-85.
46Pyle, The New Generation, pp. 55-58, 156-59.
47Saniel, Japan and the Philippines3 p. 87.
48M. A. R. Meilink-Roelofsz, Asian Trade and European Influence (The Hague: 
Nijhoff, 1962), p. 79. After a brawl in Melaka in 1615, the Portuguese also stopped 
hiring Japanese as mercenaries. I. A. Macgregor, "Notes on the Portuguese in Malaya," 
JMBRAS, 28, 2 (1956), pp. 23 n. 79, 25.
49Ahmad, Hang Tuah  ^ pp. 391-95. This is obviously a reference to the Japanese 
guard maintained by King Narai (1657-88).
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The years after 1853 saw radical changes in Japanese contacts 
with foreigners, but in 1871 there was st ill  only one Japanese r e s i ­
dent o ffic ia lly  registered in Singapore. By 1911, however, the number 
of Japanese living  there had reached 1 ,4 0 9 .50 The social backgrounds 
and occupations of these people, however, were not generally such as 
to inspire respect. There was a predominance of women, mostly p ro sti­
tutes, plying their trade in urban centers such as Singapore51 52 and in 
the Chinese mining camps. Some of the males were farmers, but many 
were small businessmen or wandering peddlers of patent m edicines. As 
a contemporary observer remarked, "There are a few Japanese merchants 
and commercial men of acknowledged standing [in Singapore], but for 
the most part the island of the Rising Sun is represented by an unde­
sirable c la s s . M52
Notwithstanding this lack of cultural and h istorical t ie s , Japan 's  
new position in world affairs  was slowly being impressed on the Riau 
no bility . In 1883 the enterprising Maharaja Abu Bakar of peninsular 
Johor, always attuned to changing patterns of diplomacy, made an exten­
sive tour of Japan, where he was granted audiences not only by the mem­
bers of the Japanese cabinet, the Prime M inister , and the imperial 
princes, but by the Emperor M eiji h im s e lf .53 Though he kept no account 
of his impressions, there can be l ittle  doubt that the stories brought 
home by his entourage would have created as much interest as the costly 
gifts  which now decorated the Johor palace. Perhaps it was memories 
of the M aharaja 's triumphal tour which prompted the Sultan of Serdang, 
on the east coast of Sumatra, to make a similar v is it  in 1898. His 
request for a royal audience was politely  refused, but he was s u f f i ­
ciently  impressed with Japanese architecture to hire Japanese gardeners 
for the landscaping of his palace grounds.5**
But of greater significance than the admiration of individual 
Malay princes was Japan 's  new elevated standing among the Europeans.
In March 1899, the Tweede Kamer (Lower House) of the Dutch Parliament 
decided to grant Japanese the same legal status as Europeans and Chris­
tians . In the Netherlands Indies reaction was immediate, and both 
Arabs and Chinese began to press for the same p r iv ile g e s .55 Coming in 
the wake of Japan 's  m ilitary  successes (and, iro n ica lly , at the same 
time as the discussion over the future of the Yamtuan Muda post in
50Yuen Choy Leng, Expansion of Japanese Interests in Malaya, 1900-1942" (M.A. 
thesis, University of Malaya, Kuala Lumpur, 1973), pp. 2, 4; Kee Yoh Sieuw, "The 
Japanese in Malaya before 1942," South Seas Society Journal, 20, 1 and 2 (1965), pp. 
48-49.
51Borel, Wijsheid en Schoonheid, pp. 51-53; Kee, "The Japanese in Malaya," p. 67.
52Kee, "The Japanese in Malaya," pp. 48-49; A. Wright and H. A. Cartwright
(eds.), Twentieth Century Impressions of British Malaya (London: Lloyd's Greater 
Britain Publishing Company, 1908), p. 127.
53Datuk Abdullah bin Mohammed, "The Travels of Abu Bakar, Maharaja Johore, to 
the Far East," Malaysia in History, 14, 2 (1971), pp. 3-9.
5**V August 21, 1921, 21, Resident Ballot of Medan to Gov. Gen., November 29,
1906; Dutch envoy in Tokyo to Gov. Gen., March 14, 1907.
55Zte Locomotief, March 4, 1899, p. 1; Reid, "Nineteenth Century Pan-Islam," pp. 
280-81; J. S. Fumivall, Netherlands India: A-Study of Plural Economy (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1939, 1967), p. 241.
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R ia u ) , the Dutch announcement made a telling  impact. It was a public 
and unambiguous acknowledgment that a nonwhite, non-Christian race 
could actually be regarded as the equal of the West and classed as 
" c i v i l i z e d ,"  the universal catchword of the late nineteenth century.
As the twentieth century began, then, i f  ideas about Japan in 
Riau were s t ill  inchoate, the name nonetheless conjured up the image 
of a country which had successfully answered the Western challenge.
Even Britain  had cultivated Japanese friendship , and in the eyes of 
the Riau court Japan soon appeared to be advancing to the first  rank 
in the world community, its prestige r iv alin g , i f  not surpassing, that 
of the Netherlands. In April 1903, as Dutch o ffic ia ls  expressed con­
cern that their representatives at the Osaka Exhibition  had received 
lower honors than those accorded Canada and A u s t r ia ,56 the Acting R esi­
dent of Riau was complaining that the Sultan and nobles considered the 
Dutch government weak, "while the recent v is it  of the Japanese training 
squadron fleet  to Batavia was seen as the beginning of the annexation 
of the Netherlands Indies by J a p a n ."57
The growing b e lie f  in Riau that Japan was strong enough to oust 
the Dutch from their entrenched position in the archipelago was con­
firmed by momentous international events. In February 1904, the same 
month that the Riau court had decided to appeal to the Raja Rum, Japan 
declared war on Turkey’ s old enemy, Russia, and this war caught the 
imagination of the entire world. All over Western Europe, music hall 
songs and illustrated  magazines dwelt on the plucky exploits of Japa­
nese soldiers against the antics of the lumbering Russian b e a r .58 
In itially , the Dutch had had no doubt that the Japanese would be de­
feated, and in Singapore Japan ’ s a lly , B rita in , m obilized troops and 
readied d e fe n s e s .59 But as the tide of battle turned in Japan ’ s favor, 
Europeans in Southeast Asia and the Pacific  region began to contemplate 
the implications of a Japanese advance into the area. In October 1904, 
the Riau Resident received an agitated telegram from Batavia, informing 
him that a warship had been sent to patrol the Riau archipelago because 
of fears that the Japanese might occupy a remote island in order to 
attack the Russian fleet as it sailed  n o r th .60 Such apprehension among 
colonial administrators could but be noted by the people they governed. 
In Singapore, the Japanese community greeted their countrymen’ s every 
victory with celebrations in the streets, while European and local 
newspapers carried detailed reports on the h o s t i l i t ie s .61 Malays who
56V March 3, 1905, C6, Dutch Envoy in Tokyo to Gov. Gen., November 12, 1904.
57V August 27, 1904, 8, Resident de Breedveldt Boer of Tanjung Pinang to Gov. 
Gen., April 27, 1903, No. 50 (Geheim). See also below, n. 115.
58Nish, The Story of Japan (London: Faber, 1968), p. 120.
59See, for example, De Loeomotief3 January 11, 1904, p. 2, and February 13, 
1904, p. 3.
60V November 30, 1904, Q25, Govt. Sec. to Resident de Kanter, October 14,
1904.
6'iDe Looomotiefy February 12, 1904, p. 3. This paper printed a map every day 
with troop positions marked and a description of the latest events; Retnodhoenrllah, a 
major Indonesian-language journal, devoted almost half of its space in 1905 to de­
tails of the campaigns. Nagazumi, ”An Indonesian’ s View,M p. 76.
136
were illite ra te  could s t ill  see the colored illustrations of Japanese 
conquests for sale in the market p laces62 and listen  enthralled as the 
significance of these was explained. In the words of the Riau R esi­
dent, news of the war "was on everyone's l i p s . " 63
As the inev itab ility  of a Japanese victory became obvious, specu­
lation grew. Where would the conqueror turn next? No doubt stimulated 
by the anxiety of the colonial government, rumors circulated that, 
having defeated Russia, the Japanese would devote their attention to 
the Netherlands In d ie s .6** In Sumatra, a missionary remarked that many 
Moslems "set all manner of hopes upon the Russo-Japanese war, and the 
speedy eviction of the Dutch . . . was the topic of eager conversa­
t i o n . " 65 A Cairo newspaper, the L iw a9, published an article  attributed 
to "our correspondent in Java" in which Japan was compared to a cat 
which would leap at the throat of its European tormentors. The Dutch, 
claimed the w riter , would be in no position to resist a Japanese a t ­
t a c k .66 For a time a rumor circulated that a Japanese fleet had actu­
ally been sighted off Singapore and that Batavia had brought in more 
warships to strengthen the Indies ' d e fe n se s .67 68
While Raja A li was in Cairo during his mission to the Middle East, 
he probably heard of the purported Japanese attack on the Netherlands 
Indies recounted in papers such as the L i w a \ ee but even before he r e ­
turned home some members of the Riau court decided to seize the oppor­
tunity of winning a new and powerful a lly . In March 1905, the chief 
of an outlying island in the archipelago came to Singapore to request 
a meeting with the Japanese consul. According to accounts received in 
Batavia, his aim was to so lic it  Japanese help in having the position 
of Yamtuan Muda restored and in preventing the proposed treaty with 
the Dutch from being f i n a l i z e d .69 Though this envoy was unable to ob­
tain the desired audience, the Riau princes were not discouraged, and 
the news of R u ssia 's  defeat served to intensify  their efforts . In 
June 1905, shortly after the draft contract with the Sultan had been 
drawn up and only two weeks after the Battle of Tsushima, Raja Hitam 
went to Singapore on the pretext of setting up a medicine shop in coop­
eration with a Japanese firm . He did not return until August, and in 
September the Batavian government received an anonymous letter claiming 
that Raja Hitam 's real reason for v isiting  Singapore had been to nego­
tiate the "handing over of the Kingdom of Lingga and Riau to Japan in
62Thijs, Be Invloed, p. 18; Ali Sastroamidjojo, Tonggak-Tonggak di Pergalananku 
(Jakarta: Kinta, 1974), p. 10.
63V March 21, 1907, 3, Resident de Kanter to Gov. Gen., October 10, 1905, No.
146.
6**V October 12, 1908, T19, G. Ghouse, envoy of Sultan of Aceh, to British Sec. 
of State, May 8, 1907, fo. 4.
65Simon, Progress and Arrest, p. 39.
66V January 12, 1905, W1, Snouck Hurgronje to Gov. Gen., November 12, 1904.
67Nagazumi, "An Indonesian's View," p. 77.
68The Liwa’ article appeared on September 4, 1904; Raja Ali Kelana and his 
party arrived in Cairo on October 27. V April 18, 1908, Dutch Agent in Cairo to 
Govt. Sec., December 18, 1904.
69V March 21, 1907, 3, Resident de Kanter to Gov. Gen., October 10, 1905.
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the Su ltan ’ s nam e.” 70 The source of this information was admittedly 
unknown, and its veracity therefore open to doubt, but the Riau R esi­
dent had also been reliably  informed of proposals among the Riau nobles 
to call on the Japanese for as s is ta n c e .71
To see this development as merely a desperate move by a b e lea ­
guered elite  is , I would suggest, to underestimate the degree to which 
the Riau court had responded to the notion that they could seek a f f i n ­
ity with Japan on the sole basis of being orang timur. It would have 
been unthinkable for Raja Hitam ’ s father, Raja A li H a ji , that Riau, 
however hard pressed, could ever have gained anything from Japan. His 
vision  and his hopes, like those of his generation, had been fixed  on 
the Middle East, and above all on the Raja Rum. Now a large number of 
the Penyengat princes were w illing  to place their future in Japan ’ s 
hands. How, one might ask, was this faith  inspired? Other Indonesians 
had expressed admiration for Japan, but they had recognized the real- 
politik  which would certainly govern Japanese foreign policy in A sia ; 
s t ill  others were too anti-Chinese to accept the idea of Asian s o l i ­
darity , even under Japanese lead ersh ip .72
From the standpoint of the Riau nobles, what imparted credib ility  
and authority to the new image of Japan was the fact that the most in ­
fluential men in the Islamic world, who had for so many years laid  
down the standards by which R iau ’ s relig ious , social, and political 
life  was governed, were themselves directing the attention of their 
Moslem brethren to the Japanese achievement. In the Middle East, 
Japan ’ s entry into the modern world and its victory over Russia were 
unanimously acclaimed across the spectrum of orthodox Islam.
Moslem Press Responses to Japan ’ s Rise
Those ’’moderates” who were convinced that Moslems had to learn 
from the West i f  Islamic society was to survive felt  that their argu­
ments had been vindicated. The secret of Japan ’ s success was her a b i l ­
ity to master Western technology and science, while at the same time 
avoiding the adoption of European customs and morals. Japan had demon­
strated that a non-Western, Asian c iv iliza t io n  had inherent strength; 
Moslems could only benefit from closer association with Japan, espe­
c ially  in educational matters. Only through knowledge could the I s ­
lamic community attain equality with the West. In the euphoria which 
followed the conclusion of the war, eager young Moslems from a number 
of countries left to study in Ja p a n .73
70Ibid. Raja Hitam was consequently forbidden to return to Singapore.
71Ibid.
72Nagazumi, MAn Indonesian’s View," p. 79; Taufik Abdullah, "Modernization in 
the Minangkabau World: West Sumatra in the Early Decades of the Twentieth Century," 
in Claire Holt (ed.), Culture and Polities in Indonesia (Ithaca: Cornell University 
Press, 1972), p. 216.
73F. Farjenel, "Le Japon et 1 * Islam," RMM, 1 (November 1906), pp. 101-2; Lewis,
The Emergence  ^ p. 326; Niyazi Berkes, The Development of Secularism in Turkey (Mon­
treal: McGill University Press, 1964), p. 359.
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On the other hand, the triumph of Japan also made its appeal to 
those Moslems who yearned for Islam to play a more m ilitant role in 
world a ffa ir s . For them, the Japanese victory in 1905 was not only a 
victory of Asians over non-Asians; it also meant the defeat of a kafir  
people which during the last century had battered down the doors of 
the Ottoman Empire. In 1890, Sultan Abdul Hamid had already made a 
gesture of friendship  to Japan by sending one of his warships there 
with a medal for the Emperor, an event which had created widespread 
excitement in Singapore. Now a Turkish-Japanese alliance was openly 
advocated in the Middle Eastern p r e s s .74 It was known that Japan was 
also among the countries included in Abdul Hamid’ s proselytizing  cam­
p a ig n ,75 and supporters of Pan-Islam were emboldened to predict great 
things in store. Somewhere--possibly India--the rumor arose that Japan 
was considering conversion to Is la m .76 However fantastic in retro­
spect, this rumor was at the time eagerly passed along and seriously 
discussed. As far afield  as Sumatra it was reported that ’’Moslems in 
India . . . had addressed a petition  to the Emperor of Japan that he
would place himself at the head of Moslems and drive all the Christians 
out of Eastern A s i a .” 77 One of the most widely read Cairo journals, 
the Mu5ayyadj whose Singapore contributors included one of Raja A l i ’ s 
asso ciates , 78 pointed out the implications a Moslem Japan would have 
for the p o litica l  situation in the Middle East now that Turkey was con­
fronted by an alliance  of Russia, England, and F rance .79 The departure 
of Egyptian, Indian , Persian, and Turkish m issionaries to Japan, r e ­
ported in the Mu'ayyad  and other papers, was accompanied by widespread
74Anthony Reid, The Contest for North Sumatra> 1858-1898 (Kuala Lumpur: Oxford 
University Press, 1969), p. 258; "Revue de la presse musulmane,” RMM, 25 (December 
1913), p. 384. In 1907 it was rumored in Pontianak that the Sultan of Turkey, with 
the aid of the Japanese, would drive the Europeans out and restore Pasir to the Sul­
tan of Pontianak. V May 29, 1908, 43, Mailrapport 1642, Kort Verslag, October 1907.
75Lewis, The Emergence9 p. 342.
76Farjenel, f,Le Japon et 1’ Islam,” p. 103. Fernand Farjenel, a member of the 
Asiatic Society of Paris and Dean of the College Libre des Sciences Sociales, was a 
Sinologist who had developed a particular interest in Chinese Moslems.
77Simon, The Progress and Arrest, p. 39. Some helpful comments about the ac­
ceptance of seemingly wild rumor can be found in Tamotsu Shibutani, Improvised News:
A Sociological Study of Rumor (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1966). He stresses in 
particular the relaxation of norms governing the acceptance of information when the 
situation is one of extreme frustration or excitement. Only people who ”do not share 
the perspective of the participants" are amazed at the currency of wild or bizarre 
rumors; see pp. 17, 12, 39, 77; also P. A. Lienhardt, "The Interpretation of Rumor," 
in J. H. M. Beattie and R. G. Lienhardt, Studies in Social Anthropology: Essays in 
Memory of E. E. Evans-Pritchard by Bis Former Oxford Colleagues (Oxford: Clarendon 
Press, 1975), pp. 105-31.
78Farjenel, "Le Japon et l'Islam," p. 105; "La presse musulmane," RMM, 9 (De­
cember 1909), p. 674; "Faits divers," RMM, 1 (December 1906), pp. 277-78; L. Bouvat, 
"La presse musulmane," RMt4y 1 (November 1906), pp. 122-29. Syed Mohd. bin cAgil of 
Singapore, who was involved in founding the Malay journal al-Imam> was also a con­
tributor to al-Mu ayyad. Usuf A. Talib, review of Bibliography of Malay and Arabic 
Periodicals in the Straits Settlements and Peninsula Malay Statesy by W. R. Roff, in 
Journal of Southeast Asian Studies3 5, 2 (1974), p. 280; L. Bouvat, "La presse 
musulmane," RMMS 9 (October 1909), pp. 328-29.
79Farjenel, "Le Japon et 1*Islam," p. 105.
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publicity  given to a Congress of Religions to be held in Tokyo in 1906. 
According to press releases, this conference, over which the Mikado 
himself would preside , had been entrusted with the task of determining 
the most suitable religion  for Ja p a n .80 Alleged eyewitness tales of 
Japanese responses to Islamic teaching contributed to notions of spec­
tacular advances by the True Faith. About 1909, for example, the e d i ­
tor of the Egyptian paper al-Irshad  made a trip to Japan and his ac­
count of his experiences, called simply Trip to Japan (al-Rihlat al- 
Yabaniyya) ,  gave the impression that mass conversions were taking place 
across the country .81
The large Indonesian community living in Mecca and other Middle 
Eastern cities  must have responded enthusiastically  to the accounts of 
Japan ’ s great knowledge, its mighty industries , its success in battle , 
and particularly  its interest in the Moslem relig io n . Riau was not 
alone in its readiness to seek support and assistance from the Japa­
n e s e .82 But at the same time the steady stream of news about Japan 
brought back to Riau by returning p ilgrim s83 84 was reinforced closer to 
home by the establishment in Singapore of a new Malay journal, al-Imam 
(The Leader) .
Al-Imam, modeled on the Egyptian paper al-Manar (The Lighthouse) , 
and reflecting  the reformist views of al-Azhar University , first  ap­
peared in July 1906 and was widely distributed throughout the Penin­
sula, Sumatra, and Java. The f id e lity  with which it relayed Arabic 
opinion on a variety of issues assured it a high standing in the Riau 
court, where it was read by the Sultan h im self . et* The interest of the
80Ibid., pp. 103, 105-12.
81,fAutour du monde musulman," RMM, 8 (June 1909), p. 283. Another view popular 
in the Middle East at this time was the argument that Japan had progressed because 
Buddhism had absorbed the soul of Islam. Berkes, The Development of Secularism in 
Turkey, pp. 342, 361.
82The rulers of Aceh, Deli, and Serdang were reported to be seeking Japanese 
support, and it was rumored that the Japanese had smuggled gunpowder and weapons into 
Serdang and Batu Bahara. Four princes from Goa in Sulawesi arrived in Singapore in 
September 1906 en route to study in Japan, and three months later two prominent nobles 
from the court of Kota Waringin in Borneo also embarked at Singapore for Japan. In 
December a Japanese newspaper, the Kokumin3 published a report of their visit to 
Tokyo. Dutch authorities believed that these nobles had hoped to recruit Japanese 
help in their efforts to gain control in Kota Waringin; well after their return rumors 
persisted of Japanese intervention in Borneo. V August 21, 1921, Resident Ballot of 
Medan to Gov. Gen., November 29, 1906; V October 12, 1908, T19, Petition by Sultan 
Alauddin Mohd. Daud of Aceh to Emperor of Japan, September 20, 1905; V June 9, 1908, 
Dutch Consul in Singapore to Gov. Gen., October 12, 1905, October 26, 1906, November 
7, 1907; V May 29, 1908, Extract from Kokumin Shimbun; V May 13, 1909, 43, Controleur 
of Samput to Resident of South and East Borneo, April 18, 1907, and Resident of South 
and East Borneo to Gov. Gen., October 13, 1908.
83The numbers of pilgrims from Riau in the late nineteenth and early twentieth 
centuries is given in J. Vredenbregt, f,The Haddj: Some of Its Features and Functions 
in Southeast Asia,” BKIy 118, 1 (1962), pp. 140-41. From 1897 to 1914, 939 people 
are registered as having made the haj, and by 1926 Riau had about 111 pilgrims per 
100,000 inhabitants, the sixth largest percentage in Indonesia. Ibid., p. 152.
84Hamka, Ajahku. Riwajat Hidup Dr. H. Abd. Karim Amrullah dan Perdjuangan Kaum
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Penyengat princes in al-Imam was also stimulated because some of their 
number, notably Raja Hitam and Raja A l i ,  were active contributors, 
while the editors were personally known to them. The founder, Shaykh 
Mohd. Tahir Jalauddin , had been educated at al-Azhar and now spent 
much of his time traveling in Riau-Lingga and the Peninsula giving r e ­
ligious instruction . He shared Raja A l i fs interest in education, and 
in 1908 the two cooperated to set up a school in Singapore, al-Iqbal 
al-Islamiyyah, under al-Imam's auspices and with funds provided by 
Raja A l i . 85 Another editor, Sayyid Shaykh bin Ahmad al-Hadi, had been 
adopted by Raja A li H a ji , Raja Hitam!s father, and raised on Penyengat, 
where he later married a Riau woman. For a time Sayyid Shaykh was in 
charge of R iau fs rumah wakaf, the hostel for religious travelers, and 
he was a prominent member of the Rushdiyyah Club. He and Raja Hitam 
were particularly  fond of debating and would often sit far into the 
night discussing Islamic theology and the reasons for the general back­
wardness of Moslems. Sayyid Shaykh had spent several years studying 
in the Middle East and s t ill  subscribed to a number of Middle Eastern 
perio dicals . He also acted as business agent for Raja A li Kelana, and 
accompanied the latter on his abortive mission to Turkey in 1904. A l ­
though Sayyid Shaykh had taken up residence in Singapore, he and Raja 
A l i ,  whom he called Mmy father and t e a c h e r /1 remained intim ates .86
The relationship  between the founders of al-Imam and the Riau 
court meant that, as Snouck Hurgronje remarked, the journal was Ma 
suitable place for [Raja A li and his advisers] to publish their desires 
and grievances. " 87 An editorial published in September 1906 pondered 
the fate of those countries which had lost their independence and of 
which nothing remained except ,fa collection of texts and s t o r i e s ."88 
A number of articles in al-Imam clearly reflected the resentment felt 
on Riau towards the changes in court protocol introduced by the colo­
nial government and above all the abolition of the Yamtuan Muda post. 
Tengku Osman, the Su ltan ’ s eldest son and Raja A l i ’ s son-in-law and 
prot6g6, who had been at school in Cairo during the crisis  over the 
1905 treaty, returned in April 1906. He was appalled at what his 
father had done. In its November issue, al-Imam published verbatim a 
speech he made to the Rushdiyyah Club. TfI think, s i r s ,1’ he had said , 
,fyou must all be very worried and sad to see what has recently occurred 
in our beloved hom eland.” 89 Another article  by Sayyid Shaykh inveighed
Agama di Sumatera (Jakarta: Penerbit Widjaya, 1958), p. 77; V April 18, 1908, 1, 
Resident de Kanter to Gov. Gen., January 24, 1907. For a description of this jour­
nal, see Roff, The Rise of Malay Nationalism, pp. 65-66; "Revue de la presse musul- 
mane," RMM, 2 (May 1907), p. 404.
85Roff, The Rise of Malay Nationalism, p. 79; Noer, The Modernist Moslem Move­
ment, p. 34. Because of his love for al-Azhar, the Shaykh added "al-Azhari" to his 
name. Al-Imam, 1, 5 (November 17, 1906), pp. 160-61.
86Roff, The Rise of Malay Nationalism, pp. 56-59, 62; V April 18, 1908, Resi­
dent de Kanter to Gov. Gen., January 24, 1907, fo. 3; S. H. Tan, "The Life and Times 
of Sayyid Shaykh al-Hadi" (B.A. Hons, thesis, University of Singapore, Dept, of His­
tory, 1961), pp. 1-5.
87V June 19, 1907, N12, Snouck Hurgronje to Min. of Colonies, June 13, 1907.
"Al-Imam, 1, 3 (September 19, 1906), p. 77.
e9Al-Imam, 1, 5 (November 17, 1906), p. 138. Although tanah air does appear in 
al-Imam, the word most commonly used for homeland is the Arabic watan, the original
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against the foreigners for placing the Eastern peoples under s lav ­
ery, for their duplicity  and disrespect to Eastern rulers , and for 
closing the doors to knowledge {ilmu) . 90
Malay problems (and, by inference, those of R ia u ) , Sayyid Shaykh 
went on, could only be overcome by the active fostering of ilmu. This 
had, indeed, been the traditional prescription for the ills  of Islamic 
society, but it is clear that to Sayyid Shaykh the connotations of ilmu 
were very d ifferent from what they had been for the previous generation 
To Raja A li H a ji , Raja Hitam ’ s father, ilmu was essentially  knowledge 
of relig ion  gained through studying with learned teachers, reading e d i ­
fying books, and adhering to t r a d it io n .91 For his sons and their con­
temporaries, on the other hand, the conception of ilmu had expanded to 
include knowledge of modern technology and the sciences. They believed 
that such knowledge had become a Western prerogative only because the 
Western colonial powers had prevented its dissem ination among Asians 
by denying them education. Colonizing governments knew that the pos­
session of ilmu was a powerful weapon which would enable a country to 
exploit its potential and to attain c iv iliza t io n  ( tamaddun) .  Though 
the meaning of tamaddun was never fully  defined , at-Imam' s readers 
were made aware that it constituted the current criterion  for judging 
a country’ s international standing. Those nations which were " c i v i ­
l ize d ” were members of a select group, bangsa yang berilmu (countries 
possessing knowledge), to whom were unfolded all the secrets of the 
technological age, "the amazing things which have appeared in the 
w o r l d ."92 Japan, it was clear, had been admitted into this privileged 
c irc le , and the key to the c iv iliza t io n  which Japan had attained was 
ilmu. It was through ilmu that a small country like Holland could 
extend its rule over m illions of people, "and the Japanese, fewer than 
f ifty  m illion , could never have defeated their enemies who were hun­
dreds of m illions strong, if  they were not in possession of that knowl­
e d g e ."93 * Even Europeans, acknowledging Japan ’ s tamaddun, went there 
to study. 9i+ It had seemed, one contributor wrote, that A s ia ’ s great­
ness had passed, but now a powerful Eastern people had emerged which 
would bring light to those who lived in darkness, raise high those who 
had been low, and bring life  to those who had been d e a d .95
In 1907, al-Imam’ s editors accordingly sponsored the translation 
and d istribution  of an Arabic work on Japan, al-Shams al-Mushriqa (The
meaning of which was origin or habitation. By the middle of the nineteenth century 
watan was commonly used in the Middle East to mean country or homeland. Lewis, The
Middle East and the West> p. 76.
90Al-Imam, 1, 6 (December 18, 1906), pp. 170-72.
91See Andaya and Matheson, "Islamic Thought and Malay Tradition," for a discus­
sion of this point.
92Al-Imam, 1, 6 (December 18, 1906), pp. 170-73 and 190. See also below,n. 102
93Al-Imam9 1, 10 (April 14, 1907), p. 314; Tan, "The Life and Times of Sayyid 
Shaykh," pp. 30-31. Japanfs possession of knowledge had previously been stressed in 
other Indonesian journals. See, for example, Nagazumi, "An Indonesian’s View of 
Japan," pp. 75-76, and Taufik Abdullah, "Modernization in the Minangkabau World," p. 
220.
9t*Al-Imam9 1, 6 (December 18, 1906), pp. 190-91.
95Ibid., and 1, 2 (August 21, 1906), p. 57.
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Rising Sun) by the Egyptian nationalist Mustafa Kamil. Subscribers 
were informed that the book, entitled  Matahari Memanoar in Malay, was 
valuable not only as a history of Japan, but also as a demonstration 
of how the country had attained c iv iliza t io n  through the industrious­
ness of its p e o p le .96 In an article  submitted some months later, 
Sayyid Shaykh bin Ahmad carried these arguments further, castigating 
Malays for their submission to colonial rule.
We believed completely that we people of the east [orang sebelah 
timur] were lacking in ability. Not for us was perfect akal [intel­
ligence], or strength of vision. We held fast to beliefs of this 
kind until we heard about the Japanese, an Asian race adorned with 
ilmu that supported a crown of victory and fame. They worked to 
increase the natural riches which were once again found in Asia.
Malays had fa iled  to achieve the same progress, Sayyid Shaykh contin­
ued, because they had forgotten the commands of their relig ion  to 
spread education and knowledge; they had not been prepared to learn 
from the Europeans and had been too indolent to follow the example of 
the Jap anese .97
For the editors of al-Imam9 Japan ’ s status as an international 
power and an ally  of Britain  did not lessen its standing as an Asian 
nation. In their view, it was clearly  aligned with the ’’black races” 
against the w h it e .98 The m ilitary  might of Japan was unquestioned, 
for ’’all the world knew” that it had just defeated Russia and, should 
war break out between Japan and the United States, the former, with 
its great sea power, would undoubtedly be the v ic t o r .99 By the same 
token, Japan could easily  defeat the Netherlands Indies . I f  the colo­
nial government persisted in its harsh exploitation , the people of the 
Indies would rise  up, free themselves from colonial tyranny, and place 
themselves under Japanese rule, which would be ’’like going from hell 
to h eaven .” 100
Nor did al-Imam ignore the question of Japan ’ s touted conversion 
to Islam, which had been so keenly discussed in the Middle Eastern
9eAl-Imam, 1, 11 (May 14, 1907), p. 354; 1, 12 (June 12, 1907), pp. 263, 285. 
See also Roff, The Rise of Malay Rationalism, p. 134 n. 23; Lewis, The Middle East 
and the West, p. 55. Datuk Abdullah bin Mohammed informs me that the translation, 
by Abdullah bin Abdul Rahman (later Datuk and Head of the Department of Religion, 
Johor), was widely read by Malays until just before World War II, when it became 
scarce, although it was never actually banned. Personal communication, May 25, 1976. 
It is interesting to note, in contrast, the low standing of Turkey and Egypt in Japan 
during this period. See Pyle, The Hew Generation, pp. 115, 167.
97Al-Imam,, 2, 1 (July 12, 1907), pp. 25-26.
"Al-Imam, 1, 8 (February 14, 1907), p. 253; and 1, 21 (August 21, 1906), p. 62. 
The writer of the latter article contended that England was simply using Japan as a 
means of possible support should it be faced with a revolt in India and that now it 
was even showing signs of friendship with Japan’s enemy, Russia. For a discussion of 
the political ideas in al-Imam, see Abdul Aziz bin Mat Ton, ’’Gerakan Ansarul Sunnah 
dalam Kegiatan Kaum Muda Melaka” (Long Essay written for History Department, Univer­
sity of Malaya, 1972), pp. 17-33.
"S e e  al-Imam, I, 2 (August 21, 1907), p. 60; and 1, 8 (February 14, 1907), pp. 
253-58.
100Al-Imam, 1, 7 (January 5, 1908), pp. 224-26.
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press. In the first  issue, under the heading "Turkey and Ja p a n ," the 
editors described the proposed Congress of Religions to be held in 
Tokyo, reporting that the Sultan of Turkey had already sent three 
representatives and had exchanged telegrams with the Emperor h im s e lf .101 
The progress of Islam in Japan was followed closely ; the same issue 
contained an analysis of the advantages which would accrue to Japan 
should it embrace Islam. The ruler of Ethiopia had adopted C h ristian ­
ity , the argument ran, but had he been accepted as an equal by the 
West? Had he been helped on the road to c iv ilizatio n ?  The Moslem com­
munity, on the other hand, would welcome Japan as a member and treat 
it as a brother. Japan would certainly  then become the most powerful 
nation on earth, allied  with m illions of Moslems throughout the world 
and honored by all other c o u n tr ie s .102 But, as another article  pointed 
out some months later, it was not only Japan which would benefit . If  
the Japanese adopted Islam as their state re lig io n , fellow Moslems 
could hope for both m ilitary assistance and intellectual enlightenment.
We would be able to mingle with them like water with sugar [seperti 
air dengan gula] and we could study from them and be taught by them 
about all the amazing things which have recently appeared in the 
world. . . .  We would then enter into the group of those people who 
are civilized . . . and the benefits would pass to our descendants.103
Although the same writer realistic a lly  acknowledged that conversion was 
unlikely  among a people who had "worshipped ido ls " (menyembah berhala ) 
for so long, their apparent lack of any true religion  did not detract 
from their possession of all the secrets of ilmu. Japan had never been 
colonized, because it had mastered these secrets; i f  the other countries 
of Asia fa iled  to follow this example, they would ultimately be totally 
dominated by the bangsa yang b e rilm u .104
One of the publicized  aims of at-Imam was "to wake Moslems from 
their sleep . . . and to communicate news of hope to th e m ."105 No 
matter that most of its articles were translations of pieces which had 
already appeared in al-Manar or other Middle Eastern journals. If  any­
thing, this fact gave its message even greater authority. Throughout 
the two years of its existence, the journal reiterated in Malay the 
lesson that Asians, and specifically  Moslems, could help themselves on 
the path to progress and c iv iliza t io n : the achievement of Japan stood 
as proof. But the argument did not stop there. As an Asian country, 
Japan would w illingly  share its great knowledge with its less fortunate 
fellows and in so doing would stand forth as A s ia !s leader and lib e r a ­
tor. Japan held out the hope that the iniquity  of colonial rule would 
soon come to an end.
™'Al-Imam, 1, 1 (July 23, 1906), pp. 30-31.
102Ibid., pp. 26-30; and 1, 2 (August 21, 1906), pp. 56-62.
1° 3Al-Imam., 1, 10 (April 14, 1907), pp. 313-15.
1°*Ibid., p. 315.
'°*Al-Imams 1, 1 (July 23, 1906), pp. 7-8.
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The Dutch Reaction
The Dutch colonial government, already concerned at the popularity 
of the slogan MAsia for the A s ia n s ,"  regarded Japan ’ s rising  status in 
the Indies with apprehension. Responding to inquiries from Batavia, a 
number of Residents from different areas described the prestige accord­
ed even the lowliest Japanese peddler. In Riau, o ffic ia ls  remarked 
that the medicine-sellers who made their way between the scattered 
islands of the archipelago were granted considerable respect, given 
free passage on Malay perahu, entertained by local c h ie fs , and of 
course addressed as tuan (s ir ) as befitted  their European r a n k .106 107
Pressed for stories , they narrated tales of Japanese power and the 
feats of the Russo-Japanese war, and one can imagine that these ac ­
counts assumed the same place in evening gatherings as had the r e c ita ­
tion of traditional hikayat . 107 Rumors had also arisen that the u b i ­
quitous medicine-sellers were in fact spies sent to reconnoitre the 
Indies prior to an eventual a t t a c k ,108 and the Dutch watched their 
growing numbers nervously. In its issue of May 14 , 1908, the Semarang 
newspaper De Locomotief expressed the general fear of a war between 
Japan and the United States, and of Japan 's  domination of the entire 
Pacific  area should it capture Hawaii and the P h il ip p in e s .109 Begin­
ning in 1907, the Governor-General required that lists  be made of the 
permits issued to Japanese intending to travel in the Indies , and in ­
vestigations were ordered into any development which suggested a fu r ­
ther increase in Japanese influence, such as the founding of Japanese- 
type schools by C h in e s e .110
In the Riau area the economic presence of the Japanese now repre­
sented a far greater threat to Dutch interests than the l ittle  store
106V March 28, 1914, F6, Controleur of Tanjung Pinang to Resident of Riau, 
November 5, 1913 (describing the situation prior to 1911), and Civiele Gezaghebber of 
Tanjung Belitung (Pulau Tujuh) to Resident of Riau, November 28, 1913.
107Stories of Japan's greatness were widespread throughout the area. A Malay 
prince from Kota Waringin in Borneo, for instance, told a reporter from the Hochi 
Shimbun in Tokyo that in his homeland Admiral T5jo was considered a god, nmightier 
than a poisoned arrow." V May 29, 1908, 32, Appendix 2, Extract from Hochi Shimbun, 
January 4, 1907.
108V March 28, 1914, F6, Resident of Ceribon to Gov. Gen., November 28, 1913.
In Malaya the British government was opposed to allowing those Japanese doctors who 
were not university graduates to practice. Japan finally forced the issue in 1916, 
but it is interesting to note that in 1907 the Sultan of Trengganu hired a Japanese 
medical attendant, Kondo, who later entrenched himself in the ruling elite and was 
primarily responsible for bringing other Japanese to Trengganu to develop mining con­
cessions after 1910. Personal communication from Leslie Robert (Monash University), 
July 22, 1976; Yuen, "Expansion of Japanese Interests," p. 114.
'i09De Locomotief, May 14, 1908, p. 1. See also Surabaya Handelsblad, October 
12, 1909, p. 2, which warns the government to be wary of Japanese travelers sketching 
railways and the like in the Indies.
11°V January 8, 1908. Circular by Govt. Sec., December 3, 1907; V January 4, 
1908, Dutch envoy in Tokyo to Gov. Gen., October 22, 1907; V March 5, 1908, Y5, 
Director of Education to Gov. Gen., January 27, 1908; Resident of Surabaya to Direc­
tor of Education, January 10, 1908. This fear, of course, became much more pronounced 
after the outbreak of the First World War. See "Japan een Gevaar voor Onze Oost?"
De Indische Gids, 38, 2 (1916), p. 182.
145
stocked with Japanese goods which Raja Hitam had set up in 1 9 0 5 .111 12
Following the rubber boom of 1909, a number of Japanese had begun to 
investigate the p o ssibility  of investing in rubber plantations in 
Singapore and neighboring Johor. From a total area of 92 acres in 
1907, Japanese-owned estates increased to 83 ,750  acres by 1911 , and in 
the following year a Japanese P lanters1 Association was established in 
S ing apo re .112 From this base Japanese business concerns expanded fu r ­
ther. They became involved in the lucrative copra trade and made 
efforts to purchase coconut plantations in outlying areas of the Riau 
residency. Despite Dutch insistence on the illeg a lity  of such trans­
actions, Raja A li and the Sultan of Riau secretly negotiated the sale 
or rental of certain islands as well as mining and copra concessions 
to individual Japanese. By 1914 the Riau Resident admitted that it 
was simply not possible to eliminate either the Japanese or their c ap i­
tal from the arc h ip e lag o .113
The m ilitary  power of Japan also became increasingly obvious.
After the Russo-Japanese war, Japan, as B r it a in ’ s a lly , was able to 
expand its naval patrols as far south as S ing ap o re ,114 and cruising 
Japanese fleets appeared more and more frequently in the Pacific  area.
In October 1910, the Sultan of Riau told the Resident that he had r e ­
ceived a v is it  from three_Japanese, led by a former army officer  who 
had served under General Oyama during Japan ’ s war against Russia. 
According to the Sultan, the group had been sent by the Japanese gov­
ernment ’’just to look around.” 115 Though the identity of these o f f i ­
cers remains a mystery, they were clearly anxious to impress the Sultan 
with accounts of Japanese involvement in the Indonesian archipelago.
The ruler of Kota Waringin, they said , was attending school in T okyo ,116 
and during the next year the Japanese government planned to issue a 
dictionary in Japanese, English, and Malay. Lessons in Malay were 
already being given in Tokyo at the School for Foreign Languages by
111V March 21, 1907, 3, Resident de Kanter to Gov. Gen., October 10, 1905.
112Yuen, ’’Expansion of Japanese Interests,” p. 25; Kee, ’’The Japanese in 
Malaya,” p. 53.
113V September 15, 1913, 52, Resident de Bruyn Kops to Gov. Gen., June 28,
1913; V February 25, 1914, C\ De Bruyn Kops to Gov. Gen., December 1, 1913, and 
Dutch Consul in Singapore to Gov. Gen., November 20, 1913; V July 9, 1914,
45, Resident Veenhuyzen to Gov. Gen., May 10, 1914; Mailrapport 1405, 1914, ’’Memorie 
van Overgave” by Resident de Bruyn Kops, March 3, 1914.
114Yuen, ’’Expansion of Japanese Interests,” p. 122.
115V February 20, 1911, L4, Resident de Bruyn Kops to Gov. Gen., October 14, 
1910. Since the late nineteenth century, Japanese vessels has cruised the Pacific 
area as part of a training program for naval cadets. These fleets often carried spe­
cial observers on board, a fact which Western powers apparently only began to notice 
during World War I. In 1891, for instance, Miyake Setsurei, a university lecturer 
noted for his enthusiastic support for Japanese expansion in the Nanyo, was allowed 
to accompany a naval training mission in the southern Pacific. Pyle, The New Genera­
tion, p. 159; Saniel, Japan and the Philippines, p. 171; V February 25, 1914, C1*, 
Adviser for Japanese and Chinese Affairs to Gov. Gen., August 26, 1913; ANA A2219,
II (Conf. No. 188, 36389, B-N), Conyngham Green to Sir Edward Grey, July 8, 1913.
116Some nobles from Kota Waringin had gone to Tokyo in 1909, which may have 
lent some credibility to this report. See above, n. 82.
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Straits Settlements Malays who, according to the Sultan, were paid 
high s a l a r ie s ,117
The impression of Japanese fascination  with the Malay world con­
veyed by the Sultan of R iau 's  guests was not wholly without b asis , for 
the area was attracting greater attention within Japan it s e lf . One 
authority has seen 1910 as the point at which Japan became a "P a c if ic "  
p ow er ,118 but increasing interest in the Indonesian archipelago can be 
detected well before th is . In 1907 , for instance, a chair in Malay 
was established at Tokyo University , and the following year sixteen 
diplomas were aw arded .119 An invitation  was also issued to young Indo­
nesians, encouraging them to complete their education at this p r e s t i­
gious institution ; and, as the Sultan had been informed, from 1908 on, 
Malay had been included in the syllabus of the Tokyo Gaikokugo Gakko 
(School for Foreign L an g u ages ).120 At the same time journ alists , Pan- 
A sian ists , minor p o litic ian s , and nationalists who had long pressed 
for more Japanese involvement in the affairs  of the Southern Seas, in ­
tensified  their efforts to influence government policy . One of the 
most outspoken of these was Yosabur5 Takekoshi (1865- 1950), a well- 
known journalist and h is t o r ia n ,121 and a member of the Lower House of 
the Japanese D iet . He was singled out by the Dutch administration for 
close observation because of his unrelenting campaign urging not merely 
Japanese expansion, but actual seizure of the Netherlands East Indies . 
In books, art ic le s , and speeches he argued that Japan held the key to 
a new order of c iv il iza t io n , and as such had a positive duty to bring 
enlightenment to those less priv ileged . In July 1905 , he had written
Western nations have long believed that on their shoulders alone 
rested the responsibility of colonising the yet unopened portions of 
the globe and extending to the inhabitants the benefits of civilisa­
tion, but now we Japanese . . . wish as a nation to take part in 
this great and glorious work. . . .  As the Southern Cross seems to 
invite the mariner to investigate the wonders of the southern seas,
117V February 20, 1911, L4, Resident de Bruyn Kops to Gov. Gen., October 14, 
1910. It does not appear that there was any Maiay/English/Japanese dictionary pub­
lished as early as 1911. Professor Shigeru Tsuchida, of the Tokyo Institute for the 
Study of Languages and Cultures of Asia and Africa, informs me that he located two 
guides to Malay in Japanese published in 1912, but neither are dictionaries, although 
they do include some word lists and phrases. Personal communication, May 26, 1976. 
Most of those Japanese interested in learning Malay were prospective rubber planters. 
In 1913, it was said that the demand was so great that a course set up by the Far 
East Asia Society (one of the Pan-Asiatic societies in Tokyo), accepted only eight 
pupils, and so had disappointed many applicants. V February 25, 1914, C1*, Dutch 
Consul in Tokyo to Gov. Gen., August 26, 1913.
118Nish, Japanese Foreign Policy3 p. 4.
119Antoine Cabaton, ,fPays Malais,11 RMMy 23 (June 1913), pp. 128-29. Malay had 
been introduced at the University of London only two years before.
i2°professor Akira Nagazumi of Tokyo University to author, March 17, 1976.
121Takekoshi*s magnum opus was The Economic Aspects of the History of the Civi­
lization of Japans in three volumes (London: Allen and Unwin, 1930), but he also 
wrote a standard work called Japanese Rule in Formosaj trans. George Braithewaite 
(London: Longmans, Green and Company, 1907), and a biography of Prince Saionji 
(Kyoto: Ritsumeikan University Press, 1933).
147
so our successes in Formosa beckon us on to fulfil the great destiny 
that lies before us and make our country "Queen of the Pacific."122
Four years later Takekoshi visited  the Netherlands Indies , and, 
upon his return to Japan, recorded his impressions in a book entitled 
Lands of the South (Nangoku-ki) ,  which aroused such interest that there 
had been ten editions by October 1 9 1 1 .123 124 The Emperor, claimed Take­
koshi, should stand as the savior of A sia , and Japan itse lf  as the 
succor of all Asian races. The Netherlands was a tenth-rate power 
which could do nothing to help the people under its rule , and it was 
therefore JapanTs responsibility  to free the Malay race from its p res­
ent miserable condition. "For there is l ittle  doubt that we have Malay 
blood in our veins. When I v isited  these islands, I felt as if  I were 
travelling in Kyushu, because the houses, the children , the fences 
around the houses, and everything in the life- style made me think of 
Japan. " 1 2i*
The kind of argument advanced by Takekoshi must have been p articu ­
larly appealing to those Japanese actually residing in the Nanyo, and 
with business interests there. In 1913, the first  Japanese newspaper 
in the archipelago was established in Singapore, entitled  the Nanyo 
Niehi Niehi Shimbun (The South Seas Daily ) .  It was closely monitored 
by the Dutch authorities , who were wary of an editorial line which 
urged Japanese expansion, especially  to South Borneo and Sulawesi, and 
which, in the same vein as Takekoshi, discussed a possible annexation 
of the Netherlands In d i e s .125 Filtering  down to Malays through conver­
sations with Japanese shopkeepers and p e d d le r s ,126 such artic le s , even
122Takekoshi, Japanese Rule in Formosa, pp. vii and 11.
123A pocket edition of this work appeared in January 1915 and at least 32 news­
papers and 18 periodicals reviewed it, in most cases favorably. Professor Nagazumi 
to author, March 17, 1976. It was also translated into Chinese under the title Nan 
Kuo Chi, or the History of the Southern Kingdoms. V March 2, 1911, Dutch Consul at 
Seoul to Sir Edward Grey, December 1, 1910.
124Quoted in Java Bode, August 30, 1910, p. 2; "Japan Begerig naar Java en 
Sumatra," De Indisehe Gids, 38, 1 (1916), pp. 448-52. According to this argument, 
the Japanese were 30 percent Mongolian, 60 percent Malay, and 10 percent other stock. 
Similar claims became stronger in later years when Japan was actively promoting 
southern expansion. V February 25, 1914, C\ Adviser for Japanese and Chinese Af­
fairs to Gov. Gen., August 26, 1913, and Mailrapport 1156, 1926, article from Jawa 
Nippo, November 4, 1921.
125Yuen, "Expansion of Japanese Interests," p. 19; V February 25, 1914, C^, 
Adviser for Japanese and Chinese Affairs to Gov. Gen., December 13, 1913.
126By 1914, there were 38 Japanese retail shops in Singapore, and the Contro- 
leur of Kerimun in the Riau Residency noted that the two resident medicine-sellers 
in his area had married Malay women and adopted Islam. Such people would certainly 
have been literate and at least in the urban centers would have had access to Japa­
nese newspapers. Several writers on Japanese society have emphasized the widespread 
literacy in Japan and the influence of newspapers on public opinion. V March 28, 
1914, F6, Controleur of Kerimun to Resident of Riau, December 24, 1913; Kee, "The 
Japanese in Malaya," p. 50; R. P. Dore, "The Legacy of Tokugawa Education," in Marius 
B. Jansen (ed.), Changing Japanese Attitudes toward Modernization (Princeton: Prince­
ton University Press, 1969), pp. 102-3; Nish, Japanese Foreign Policy, pp. 84-85; 
Pyle, The New Generation, p. 82.
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in a distorted version, would have served to reinforce Japan ’ s image 
as a nation that would drive out the foreigners and introduce the en­
lightened rule of a great Asian nation.
Developments in Riau
Since the end of the Russo-Japanese War, Indonesians, and p articu ­
larly  Moslem Indonesians, had been subject to an ever increasing amount 
of information about Japan, a combination of rumor, personal account, 
exhortation, and instruction. At the same time, within Japan it s e l f , 
there was growing grass-roots support for a populist Pan-Asianism which 
would have Japan take a more m ilitant stand against the colonial powers 
in the Nanyo. The impact of these developments in practical terms can. 
be seen i f  we turn again to Riau and examine events there immediately 
prior to the outbreak of World War I .
Though nothing had come of R iau ’ s proposed appeal to Japan in 
1905, it had not been forgotten. Meanwhile, the whole issue of the 
Yamtuan Muda position  and the succession to the Riau throne smoldered, 
kept alight by constant reminders that the members of the Riau court 
were simply pensioned puppets. During this time the Sultan himself 
was drawn farther into what the Dutch called ’’the Bugis opposition 
p a r t y ,” and, according to the Resident, ” the learned Raja A li and Raja 
Hitam” now wielded great influence with the ruler . In their conversa­
tions with the Sultan , they constantly compared R iau ’ s present s itu a ­
tion with its past glory and impressed on him the view that he had 
surrendered not only his money but his prestige and self-respect to 
the D u t c h .127 The frequency of clashes between court and adm inistra­
tion lent weight to arguments that the Dutch should assume direct con­
trol over Riau-Lingga. In 1910, these disputes were brought to a head 
when the Sultan , on the advice of his m inisters, refused to sign a new 
p o litica l contract, claiming that it would deprive him of any real 
authority. His adamancy provided the Dutch with sufficient cause for 
action , and in February of the following year he was formally deposed 
and exiled  to S in g ap o re .128 A few days after his arrival there, how­
ever, the ex-Sultan handed over copies of all treaties made between 
himself and the Dutch to the Japanese c o n s u l .129 On several occasions 
he met Japanese representatives privately , and he even sent a letter 
to the commander of the Japanese squadron in Singapore, whom he had p re ­
viously entertained as a g u e s t .130 Though Dutch agents were unable to
127V February 10, 1911, Y3, Note by Resident de Bruyn Kops, December 28, 1910.
128For a Dutch explanation of their action, see the Nieuwe Rotterdamsohe 
Courant3 February 11, 1911, Avondblad D, and Kielstra, "Nederland’s Betrekkingen tot 
Riau,” pp. 185-214.
129It is unlikely that the consul, who had been unsympathetic in his dealings 
with Sun Yat Sen, would have, given Sultan Abdul Rahman more than a perfunctory hear­
ing. He was later indirectly criticized by the Japanese newspaper in Singapore, the 
Nanyo Nichi Niohi Shimbun3 because he had not taken the part of certain Japanese who 
had been arrested in Java for opium smuggling. See Jansen, The Japanese and Sun Yat 
Sen3 p. 130; and Mailrapport 698, 1913, Adviser for Japanese and Chinese Affairs to 
Gov. Gen., March 24, 1913.
130V March 29, 1911, E7, Dutch Consul in Singapore to Gov. Gen., February 17,
1911.
149
discover the subject of these conversations and the letter , it was pre­
sumed that they concerned an appeal by the Sultan for Japanese in te r ­
vention on his behalf. Large numbers of Riau Malays packed up their 
belongings and fled  to Singapore in the b e lie f  that a great war was 
about to break out between the Dutch and Japan, with the possible 
intervention of T u rkey .131
In Tokyo, the exile of the Riau Sultan provided ready fuel for the 
small band of Moslems and Pan-Asianists who wished to see greater Japa­
nese involvement in the Nanyo. The Sultan of Riau had written what 
Resink describes as a unique letter to the Straits Times protesting 
against his d e p o s it io n ,132 and his letter was reprinted in a journal 
called the Dai To (The Great E a s t ) , the mouthpiece of the A jia  G ikai. 
This group, typical of a number of Pan-Asiatic societies in Japan, had 
been founded in 1910 and had the support of several prominent opposi­
tion p o lit ic ia n s . The Dutch authorities believed that the A jia  Gikai 
had close links with the Japanese General S ta ff , and its pronouncements 
were therefore taken to be of some s ig n if ic a n c e .133 134
The Su ltan ’ s letter , published in fu l l , expressed his anger, and 
that of the Riau court, at the Dutch action; it went on to denounce 
the proposed treaty of 1910. He had refused to sign this treaty, he 
said , because it would have reduced him to the position of nominal 
ruler, depriving him of any power whatsoever. The only motive for his 
deposition , the Sultan claimed, was the Dutch desire to obtain the 
collection  of Mall the revenues, mining and other concessions.” 13^
Accompanying this letter was an article  written in English and 
entitled  "Tyranny of the Dutch in the East In d ie s ,"  which placed the 
deposition in a wider context of alleged anti-Moslem actions by the 
Dutch.
In its issue of February 15, 1911, our contemporary, the Straits 
Times of Singapore, contains the following letter which ought to 
serve as an eye-opener to all Moslem states that are rightly strug­
gling to be free. The European powers that have dominion over Mos­
lem lands are bound out of imperial considerations to use all possi­
ble means in preventing the regeneration of Moslem states. But the 
treatment accorded to Moslems in Java, Sumatra, and other East Indies 
[areas] by the Dutch government is the most atrocious in the annals 
of mankind. These Moslems are guarded like criminals, treated like 
brutes, forbidden to hold intercourse with the outside [world].
Since the Russo-Japanese war, ruler after ruler has been deposed by 
treachery on the part of the government. We advise our Moslem
131V April 18, 1911, S8, Resident de Bruyn Kops to Gov. Gen., March 1, 1911.
132G. R. Resink, Indonesia's History between the Myths (The Hague: Van Hoeve, 
1968), p. 95.
133V January 30, 1912, Military Attache, Dept, of War, August 15, 1911, 74; De 
Locomotief, January 28, 1911. The politicians involved with the Ajia Gikai were said 
to be the Constitutional National Party leader Inukai Tsuyoshi (1855-1932), Kono 
Hironaka (1849-1923), and the Pan-Asianist Toyama Mitsuru (1855-1944).
134Sultan of Riau to Editor of Straits Times, February 15, 1911.
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brothers to strive after knowledge of the Koran and modern sciences, 
and despair not of divine assistance.135
A few months later , in A p r il , the journal of the newly established 
Tokyo Islamic Brotherhood, which was headed by a British  Indian and de­
voted to promoting the image of Japan in Moslem countries, also pub­
lished an article  describing colonial rule in the Indies . Dutch o f f i ­
cials  were convinced that the w riter , who signed himself "Anonymous" 
of Johor Bahru, was actually one of the exiled  members of the Riau 
royal fam ily. The Dutch intelligence system was highly e ff ic ie n t , and 
the suspicion was probably correct. Regardless of its origin , the de­
scription of Dutch rule by this unknown author conveys some idea of the 
bitterness felt by the Riau court. Two hundred and f ifty  years of 
colonial oppression, he wrote, had brought the once mighty kingdoms of . 
the Indies to their knees. The greatest Dutch crime, however, was 
their prohibition  of "the entrance of teachers of Islam and learned 
men of the r e l ig io n ," and their indifference to the fact that the 
people they governed Mare a noble race among the descendants of Adam, 
intellectually  and morally. They possess, like other people, great 
capacity to progress if  the circumstances would permit and teachers be 
forthcoming. 11
Appealing to Japanese readers, the writer went on to repeat the 
claims put forward by men like Takekoshi. Those now suffering under 
Dutch rule "belong to the same stock that the Japanese do, as the sim i­
larity  of their features and customs t e s t i f i e s .” 136
The Riau court was not sa t is fie d , however, with simply sending 
letters to foreign journals, and there can be no doubt that the princes 
were determined to fight for the reinstatement of the sultanate. In 
August 1911, Sultan Abdul Rahman wrote personally to Queen Wilhelm ina, 
begging for her mediation so that f!I w ill not end my days as an e x ile , 
in shame and h u m iliat io n .’1 He even announced his w illingness to step 
aside in favor of his young grandson, i f  the latter would be more 
acceptable as a future r u l e r .137 The Dutch rejection  of this proposal, 
the establishment of direct European government in Riau, and the igno­
minious banishment of the foremost princes , were regarded by the court 
as outrageous. It was unthinkable that descendants of a dynasty which 
had ruled for two hundred years could be swept aside in such a fashion . 
What was obviously needed was a powerful patron w illing  to stand with 
Riau against the colonial adm inistration. Faced with a sim ilar s itu a ­
135V January 30, 1912, Military Attache, extract from Dai To, February 1911.
The letter also appeared in a book by a university economist, Inouye Kijoshi, enti­
tled Nanyo to Nihon {The Southern Pacific and Japan), published in Tokyo in 1913, pp. 
114-24. I am grateful to Mr. Akira Oki of the Department of Pacific and Southeast 
Asian History, Australian National University, for this reference.
136V November 4, 1911, Gov. Sec. to Gov. Gen., September 18, 1911. The founder 
of the Islamic Brotherhood, Hassan Hatano, was associated with Indian nationalists.
ANA A2219 (Secret Abstracts of Intelligence, General Staff, Straits Settlements) 4/18, 
96. The journal was published in English, but had a monthly Japanese supplement. 
"Revue de la presse musulmane," RMM> 25 (December 1913J, p. 382.
137V April 18, 1911, S8, Resident de Bruyn Kops to Gov. Gen., March 1, 1911;
V October 21, 1911, 33, Sultan of Riau to Queen Wilhelmina, received August 20, 1911, 
fo. 11.
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tion eight years before, Raja A li and his following had seen their 
natural protector in the Raja Rum, but they now understood, i f  only 
vaguely, that since 1908 the Ottoman Sultan had relinquished his 
authority to a group of modernizing reformers, who were themselves 
hard pressed by Italy and the Balkan a llies  (Serbia , Greece, Albania , 
and B u l g a r ia ) .138 There was virtually  no likelihood that help of any 
material nature would be forthcoming from Turkey at this point, and to 
expect assistance from any European power, such as England, was c lear­
ly f u t i l e .139 As in 1905, it seemed that Japan was the only possible 
source of aid , but this time there would be no prelim inaries with 
minor o f f ic ia ls ; this time Riau would send an appeal directly  to the 
Japanese Emperor him self. In September 1912, nearly two years after 
the Su ltan 's  deposition , the indefatigable Raja Hitam was reported to 
be collecting money from Riau residents v isiting  Singapore to finance 
a trip to Japan, and plans were also afoot to extend his campaign 
throughout the Riau arch ip elag o .140
Raja Hitam was su fficiently  astute to realize  that any such col­
lection could not be made openly, since it would certainly  arouse Dutch 
opposition and mean protests to the Singapore government. Instead, he 
set up a Malay trading cooperative in Singapore which sold copra d i ­
rectly , rather than through Chinese businessmen as was customary. The 
majority of the members came from the copra-rich Pulau Tujuh area, and 
their subscription fee of $100 (Singapore) was incorporated into Raja 
Hitam 's funds for the trip to J a p a n .141 When this venture fa ile d , Raja 
Hitam turned to other means of obtaining money. Documents were drawn 
up for land ownership in preparation for the Japanese administration 
which, v illagers  were assured, would take over when R iau 's  case was 
presented personally to the Emperor. Apparent legitimacy was given to 
these claims by Raja Hitam 's agents, two haji  and a Japanese medicine- 
se lle r , who traveled to remote islands informing the inhabitants that 
the Sultanate would soon be restored and that only these new documents, 
available for $15 (S ingapore), would then be acceptable proof of land
138See Berkes, The Development of Secularism in Turkey3 pp. 269 ff. for a dis­
cussion of the secular aspects of the Young Turk movement. Resident de Bruyn Kops 
said he had discussed the new administration in the Turkish government with Raja Ali 
and Raja Hitam in order to point out the advantages of such changes. V February 10, 
1911, Y3, note by Resident de Bruyn Kops, December 28, 1910, fo. 20. The Italo- 
Turkish war of 1912 had also aroused great interest in Singapore, where collections 
were made to support the Turkish forces. V November 2, 1912, 20/2373, Adviser for 
Native Affairs to Gov. Gen., April 4, 1912; Tan, ,fThe Life and Times of Sayyid 
Shaykh," p. 43.
139The Governor of the Straits Settlements informed the Dutch consul that the 
ex-Sultan of Riau, whom he described as ,!a harmless old man,1’ had come to pay his 
respects. "I said I was sorry that he had quarrelled with the authorities and sug­
gested to him that he should go to Batavia and endeavor to see the Governor General 
and try and come to some arrangement. . . .  He thanked me for my advice, but I doubt 
if he will follow it ." V April 18, 1911, S8, Sir John Anderson to Dutch Consul in 
Singapore, March 7, 1911.
14°V July 21, 1913, 5, Dutch Consul in Singapore to Resident de Bruyn Kops, 
September 16, 1912.
141V April 12,1913, 15, Civiele Gezaghebber at Pulau Tujuh to Resident de Bruyn 
Kops, February 6, 1913.
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ow nership .142 Money was also collected under the guise of sedekah, or 
alms, from the Riau pilgrims lodging in Singapore, while several mem­
bers of the exiled  royal fam ily, now living in Singapore and Johor, 
contributed funds from the sale of their personal b e lo n g in g s .143
The decision to send a mission to Japan was thus not an indepen­
dent and unsupported move by a few individuals . The Riau nobles c le ar ­
ly anticipated success. They may on this occasion have received spe­
c ific  encouragement from a Singapore acquaintance of Raja Hitam, a 
Japanese doctor named Arito Sato, who had once been entertained in the 
Penyengat is tana (palace) and to whom Raja A li had rented concessions 
on several i s l a n d s .144 Another factor contributing to the general 
optimism was probably the presence in Tokyo of a Penyengat man, Encik 
Ahmad, a friend  of Raja A li and son-in-law of Johor’ s Menteri Besar. 
According to Dutch reports, Encik Ahmad was employed as a Malay teacher 
at the Tokyo School for Foreign Languages, and prior to his departure 
from Singapore he had received a v is it  from the ex-Sultan of R i a u .145 
But even without such encouragement the Riau nobles had, over the 
years, been led to believe that the Japanese government would lend a 
sympathetic ear to pleas for help; accordingly, sometime in October 
1912, a letter was drawn up asking for the Emperor’ s personal interven­
tion so that Riau could be placed under Japanese rule and the Sultan 
restored to his former p o s it io n .146
On October 31, Raja Hitam left for Tokyo, carrying with him the 
Riau petition  signed by the Sultan and his advisers. Among his coun­
trymen rumors spread w ildly . Dutch spies heard that Raja Hitam would 
become a naturalized  Japanese c itizen  in order to enter Riau secretly ; 
the Singapore consul informed Batavia that an o fficer  from the Japanese 
flagship Kongo , then docked in Singapore, had reportedly been seen 
charting islands in the Riau archipelago. A German source in St. 
Petersburg even relayed the information that Japan planned to buy Riau 
from the D utch !147
142Ibid., and V July 21, 1913, 5, Resident de Bruyn Kops to Gov. Gen., April 
29, 1913. Raja Hitam received very little support from people in the Pulau Tujuh 
group, possibly because they lived so far from the central administrative districts 
and thus for them the Sultan was only a vague figure. The haji concerned were 
jailed, and the money, amounting to $1,000 (Singapore), confiscated and returned to 
those who had bought the false documents. Mailrapport 1405, 1914, ,fMemorie van 
Overgave” by Resident de Bruyn Kops, March 3, 1914.
143As above, n. 136, and V April 12, 1913, 15, Resident de Bruyn Kops to Gov. 
Gen., February 18, 1913.
144V July 9, 1914, 45, Resident Veenhuyzen to Gov. Gen., May 10, 1914. Sato 
had also made some land purchases in Kota Waringin, where there had been similar 
attempts to appeal to the Japanese government. See above, n. 82.
145V March 29, 1913, 26, Dutch Envoy in Tokyo to Gov. Gen., December 27, 1912; 
V July 21, 1913, 5, Dutch Consul in Singapore to Resident de Bruyn Kops, September 
16, 1912.
146V January 13, 1913, 63, Resident de Bruyn Kops to Gov. Gen., November 7,
1912.
147Ibid., Minister of Foreign Affairs to Minister of Colonies, January 3, 1913; 
V March 29, 1913, 26, Dutch Consul in Singapore to Dutch Envoy in Tokyo, January 20, 
1913; V January 30, 1913, f, Resident de Bruyn Kops to Gov. Gen., November 21, 1912;
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Meanwhile, on arriving in Tokyo, Raja Hitam had gone directly  to 
Encik Ahmad’ s house, assuming an alias to avoid detection by the Dutch. 
He was not successful, however, in escaping the eagle eye of the Dutch 
intelligence system. The consul in Tokyo was soon able to confirm not 
only that Raja Hitam had arrived, but that he had left Japan after a 
few days, returning to Singapore via Yokohama.148 Lacking information 
from those involved, it is d iff ic u lt  to ascertain the reasons behind 
Raja Hitam fs precipitate  departure. He may have been influenced by 
Encik Ahmad’ s unfavorable opinion of the Japanese and his argument 
that the Riau court was too optim istic in its hopes for Japanese a s s is ­
tance. When interviewed by Dutch agents, Encik Ahmad only explained 
that his friend had left quickly because ’’very little  happened here, 
and he found it too c o ld .” 149 Nonetheless, despite this disappoint­
ment, the Riau p rin ces ’ b e lie f  that a personal audience with the Em­
peror would surely result in Japanese aid appeared unshaken. In April 
1913, shortly after his return, Raja Hitam and several of the exiled 
princes were said to be again collecting money to finance a trip to 
J a p a n ,150 and once more the rumors of an imminent restoration of the 
Sultanate sprang u p .151 During the ensuing months, repeated meetings 
were held in Singapore among a group which included the Menteri Besar 
of Johor (Encik Ahmad’ s father-in-law), Raja Hitam, and other members 
of the Riau court. For a time there was even talk that the Menteri 
Besar himself might accompany Raja Hitam to Japan, presumably in the 
b e lie f  that this eminent personage would fa c ilita te  access to the 
Emperor’ s p re se n c e .152 Raja A li and his friend  of al-Imam days, Sayyid 
Shaykh al-Hadi, were also active fund raisers . In May 1913 , they made 
a trip to British-controlled Trengganu to collect money and so lic it  
the support of the Trengganu ruler , while the ex-Sultan of Riau p er­
sonally contributed three thousand Straits dollars towards the en­
deavor . 153
The following June another meeting was held in Johor at which it 
was decided that Raja Hitam and Raja A li should leave for Japan as soon 
as the necessary money had been raised , taking with them the deeds to 
thirty plots of coconuts contributed by Riau Malays as a g ift  in return
V February 25, 1914, C1*, Dutch Consul in Singapore to Gov. Gen., November 20, 1913, 
and De Bruyn Kops to Gov. Gen., December 1, 1913.
148V June 11, 1913, Dutch Envoy in Tokyo to Gov. Gen., March 31, 1913.
149Ibid., and V April 15, 1914, 27, f,Verslag van een onderhoud met Raja Hitam," 
by a Majoor van den Generalen Staf, January 19, 1914.
150Ibid., Dutch Vice-Consul in Singapore to Gov. Gen., April 8, 1913.
151V July 21, 1913, Resident de Bruyn Kops to Gov. Gen., April 29, 1913.
152V July 26, 1913, 13, Dutch Vice-Consul in Singapore to Gov. Gen., May 14, 
1913. Datuk Abdullah bin Mohammad of Johor Baharu considers it unlikely that the 
Menteri Besar of Johor, Datuk Ja’afar bin Haji Mohd. (born 1837) would have been per­
sonally involved in Raja Hitam’s adventures, although the family connections between 
Riau and Johor were very close. Personal communication, May 25, 1976.
153V August 9, 1913, Dutch Vice-Consul in Singapore to Gov. Gen., May 30, 1913;
V September 15, 1913, Vice-Consul of Singapore to Gov. Gen., June 25, 1913. For a 
discussion of Riau’s relations with Trengganu, see J. de Vere Allen, ’’The Ancien 
Regime in Trengganu, 1909-1919,” JMBRAS3 41, 1 (1968), pp. 38-46.
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for Japanese a s s is ta n c e .15** On December 11, Raja Hitam le ft , again 
alone, since Raja A li had taken up the position  of Ketua Agama (r e l i ­
gious head) in Johor and could not leave his p o s t .* 155 But after all 
this effort and planning, the results were less than nothing. On 
March 11, 1914, after a br ie f  period in a Japanese hospital, Raja 
Hitam died , apparently succumbing to the bitter  cold of Tokyo’ s w in ­
t e r .156 Among his papers were found correspondence between the Riau 
Resident and the Sultan, the court’ s finance books for 1911 and 1912, 
and copies of notes concerning the sale of certain areas in Riau to 
Japanese. Among these, the Dutch consul could find  Mno facts of in te r ­
est to the government,” and as far as the Netherlands Indies authorities 
were concerned, the matter was c lo s e d .157
Conclusion
With the outbreak of the Great War in August 1914 and the trau­
matic events of the next five years, the a ffa irs  of Riau sank into in ­
sig n ificance , even for the Dutch. Though Japan was clearly more 
interested in the Nanyo than before, it was now absorbed by power p o l i ­
tics on a grand scale , and another decade was to pass before the 
Japanese government began to think seriously about southward expansion 
and consider the p ossibility  of exploiting Islam as a p o litica l t o o l .158 
Despite the hopes raised by the Japanese victory over Russia and the 
urging of successive Japanese politicians  and n a tio nalists , there was 
at no time any real likelihood of a confrontation between Japan and 
the colonial nations in the Southern Seas. The concept of a Japan-led 
’’Greater A s ia ” had its attractions, but o ffic ia l  Japanese policy was 
essentially  to gain acceptance as a modern, Westernized power. As the 
Japanese consul in Australia wrote in 1905, ” 0ur claim . . .  is for 
recognition of our equal status with European nations in the numerous 
things which are comprised in the term ’ c i v i l i s a t i o n .1” 159 Japanese 
delegations to European conferences might continue to press for the 
elim ination of racial inequality , but in Singapore in 1915 Japanese 
sailors as well as about 100 Japanese nationals played a crucial role in 
assisting  the ill-prepared B ritish  to suppress a mutiny among Indian 
se p o y s .160 A few months later a member of the Lower House of the
15**V September 15, 1913, 52, Dutch Vice-Consul in Singapore to Gov. Gen., June 
25, 1913.
155V January 26, 1914, 62, Gov. Secretary to Dutch Consul in Singapore, Decem­
ber 11, 1913; V February 20, 1914, Dutch Consul in Singapore to Gov. Gen., December 
20, 1913. Because of Dutch pressure, Raja Ali was deprived of his position later 
that year. He died about 1919. Allen, ’’The Ancien Regime,” p. 40 n. 79; Tan, ’’The 
Life and Times of Sayyid Shaykh,” p. 43.
156V April 15, 1914, 27, Tokyo Envoy to Gov. Gen., March 14, 1914.
157V July 9, 1914, 45, Resident Veenhuyzen to Gov. Gen., May 10, 1914.
158Harry J. Benda, The Crescent and the Rising Sun (The Hague: Van Hoeve, 
1958), pp. 103-5.
159ANA A2219, I, Japanese Consul in Australia to Attlee Hunt, September 20,
1905.
i6°Yuen, ’’Expansion of Japanese Interests,” p. 115.
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Japanese Diet publicly  protested that it was "truly  outrageous" for 
Japanese to be treated "iden tic a lly  with Chinese and In d i a n s ."161
Such comments raise the question of why the Riau court continued 
to believe in what one Dutch resident called "the fiction  of a good 
relationship between the Su ltan ’ s party and J a p a n ."162 In objective 
terms it is obvious that there was never even a remote chance of Japa­
nese interference in Riau. On what, then, was the faith  of the Riau 
princes based? There is no indication that they had any connection 
with the Western-educated Indonesians who were lauding Japanese suc­
cess, and with whom they would have had litt le  in common.163 Across 
the Straits in Johor, neither Abu Bakar nor his son Sultan Ibrahim a t ­
tempted to exploit their contacts with Japan in dealing with the 
B r itish , despite their admiration of things Ja p a n e se .16** Nor can 
R iau ’ s expectations of Japan be seen as part of the nationalist mood 
discernible  elsewhere in A sia . The Sultan and his advisers, though 
aware of what was happening in , for example, China and I n d i a ,165 did 
not want "independence" as such; themselves m ilitarily  and diplom ati­
cally  powerless, they saw acceptance of Japanese suzerainty as the 
only means of evicting the Dutch.
The tenacity of the assumption that Japan would be w illing  to 
take up the Riau cause is perhaps more readily  understood by recalling 
the sources of most of R iau ’ s ideas about Japan and by considering the 
manner in which Malays had traditionally  gained information concerning 
notable events in the world. Prior to the nineteenth century, the 
most reputable news was that carried by itinerant scholars and teachers 
from the Middle East who, traveling between religious centers like 
Aceh, Riau, and Palembang, brought the opinions and pronouncements of 
Islam ’ s heartland to the notice of the Malay courts. During the course 
of the nineteenth century, as access to the Middle East became easier 
and communication more rapid , this network, essentially  oral, expanded 
and developed through the written word to encompass the entire Moslem 
community. But while media such as newspapers and telegraph were inno­
vations, the origins of the issues they discussed were quite tr a d i­
tional; emanating from the foremost spokesmen of Islam, articulated in 
the Prophet’ s own tongue, they commanded the attention of Moslems 
everywhere.
161ANA A2219, I, External Affairs, 11305, February 5, 1916.
162Mailrapport 1405, 1914, "Memorie van Overgave" by Resident de Bruyn Kops, 
March 3, 1914, fo. 237.
163Among the Riau princes only Sultan Abdul Rahman’s three sons had had any 
European education. They had spent about eighteen months at the hoofdensohool in 
Bandung but returned to Riau because of illness, and then continued their education 
in Cairo. Nieuwe Rotterdamsohe Couvant, September 18, 1901, p. 1; V October 6, 1905, 
54, Egyptian Under Sec. of State to Dutch Consul in Cairo, December 22, 1904.
16**Among the Johor elite prior to World War II, Sultan Ibrahim looked to London 
to balance Singapore, and the nobles who opposed him looked to the British to balance 
the Sultan. Mr. Christopher Gray of Yale University to author, April 6, 1977.
165The movements for independence in a number of countries had been discussed 
in al-Imam. See, for example, 2, 2 (August 10, 1907), p. 59.
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For nearly a hundred years Islamic society had debated the issue 
of its backwardness in relation to the Christian West,and its lack of 
so much that was subsumed under the Western notion of c iv iliza t io n . 
"C iv il iz a t io n ” meant modernity and might, and in that sense was d e s ir ­
able; but would the emulation of in fidels  which it entailed ultimately 
result in the corruption of Islamic morals by Christian or secular in ­
fluences? Was the superiority of the West so great that it was des­
tined to maintain its dominance forever? The achievement of Japan had 
provided the answer to Islam 's  dilemma. Japan was now deemed " c i v i ­
lized"-  -yet it had not surrendered itse lf  to alien  values or customs. 
By its example it had earned the right to become the mentor of all 
A sians, and especially  those of the Moslem fa ith . This was the author 
itative  message which for more than a decade had been transmitted to 
Riau via  its links with the great Islamic centers of the Middle East. 
Sanctioned by the authority of re lig io n , the claims of Japan 's  read i­
ness to defend its  fellow  Easterners against the Westerners assumed a 
greater c r e d ib ility , shoring up the hope that under the Japanese 
umbrella the in fidels  would be evicted , the old order reinstated , and 
the country opened up to the ilmu that would restore R iau 's  lost p res­
tige .
